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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTREVOCATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE WITHOUT HEARING
Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident while driving within
the state and was unable to meet the security requirements of the California
vehicle responsibility law.' Pursuant thereto the Department of Motor
Vehicles suspended his driver's license without a hearing. Petitioner sought
a writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement of the license. He attacked the
constitutionality of the act, alleging that by its application he was denied due
process of law. Held (5-2), petition denied. Suspension of a driver's license
without a preliminary hearing but subject to subsequent judicial review is
not a denial of due process. In view of the substantial number of financially
irresponsible drivers, a hearing prior to suspension would burden if not defeat
operation of the law. Escobedo v. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 35
Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
The right of a state to regulate its highways is well established. 2 In
exercising this right, all but three states have enacted some type of financial
responsibility legislation 3 which has generally been upheld as a valid exercise
of the police power.4 In upholding the constitutionality of the act in the
1. This act provided that every operator involved in an automobile accident resulting in personal injury or death, or more than $100 damage to property, must report the
matter in writing to the Department of Motor Vehicles within ten days. Within sixty
days after filing the report, each operator involved must deposit security sufficient, iii
the opinion of the department, to satisfy any judgment which may be recovered
against the operator or the owner as a result of the accident. No deposit is necessary if
the operator's potential liability is covered by sufficient, approved insurance. Failure
to comply with the provisions results in suspension of the operator's driver license until
such requirements are met or one year has passed without an action being filed against
him. There is no express requirement for a hearing prior to suspension. CAL. VEHTCLU
CODE §§ 419-420.9 (1949).
2. Hodge Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335, 52 Sup. Ct. 144, 76 L. Ed. 323 (1932);
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916)
(city
ordinance) ; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915).
3. See THE PREsmENT's HIGHWAY SAFETY CONFERENCE, ColilTTEE LAWS AND
ORDINANcE REPORT (1949). For complete statutory citations as of 1950, see Grad, Recent
Developments in Attomobile Accident Compensation, 50 COL. L. REV. 300, 307 n.24
(1950). See also Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 LAW & CONTEMtP. PROnD.
505 (1936) ; Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Lau's, 3 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 519 (1936). Financial responsibility legislation similar to the California
Act has recently been enacted in Tennessee. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c.206. The Commissioner of Safety is authorized to suspend the driver's license of an operator involved
in an accident who fails to meet the security requirements. (§ 4). The suspension is
to be effective until the operator shows financial responsibility for the damages arising
out of the accident, a final judgment of nonliability, is rendered or until after one year
no action has been filed against him. (§ 5g). Upon the request of any person aggrieved
by orders or acts of the Commissioner, a hearing will be provided, if the request is
made within thirty days after the order or act (§ 2a).
4. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Price, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653 (1937); Watson v.
State Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481 (1931); In re Opinion
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instant case, the court based its decision on the doctrine allowing the legislature to authorize summary action subject to later judicial review of its
validity when such a course is justified by compelling public interest. 5 While
there is ample authority for this proposition,6 an analysis of the cases decided
upon the principle indicates that two factors are necessary for its application:
(1) a danger to the public, and (2) a need for immediate action.7 If there
is a correlation between a financially irresponsible driver and one who
presents an immediate danger to the public, the essential elements of the
doctrine would seem to be present in the instant case.8
Generally, in determining the constitutionality of legislation revoking or
suspending a license, the courts distinguish between those which grant a
property or contractual right and those which confer a mere privilegeY
However, the court in the instant case, apparently of the opinion that the
nature of the right was immaterial in light of the "compelling public interest"
present, failed to determine whether there was a property right or a mere
privilege involved. In the absence of any question of public interest, the cases
agree that if a license grants a property or contractual right, all elements of
due process must be present upon suspension or revocation. 10 If, on the other
hand, the license confers a mere privilege, it is surrounded by few legal
protections." A license to operate an automobile is held not to fall within
of The Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N.E. 680 (1925) ; Surtman v. Secretary of State,
309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471 (1944); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 At.
701 (1938); Garford Trucking Inc. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 552, 177 Atl. 882 (Sup.

Ct. 1935); Jones v. Harnett, 247 App. Div. 7, 286 N.Y. Supp. 220 (1st Dep't 1936),

aff'd, 271 N.Y. 626, 3 N.E.2d 455 (1936); Nutler v. State Road Commission, 119

W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
5. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442, 64 Sup. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944).

6. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442, 443, 64 Sup. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834

(1944) ; Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 Sup. Ct. 599, 88 L. Ed.

629 (1944) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97, 51 Sup. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed.
1298 (1931); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 569, 65 L. Ed. 1084

(1921) ; Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 584, 33 Sup. Ct. 610, 57 L. Ed. 971 (1913) ;

North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 212 U.S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed.

195 (1908).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. "There is no issue of immediate danger to the public health involved ....
The
sole need is that a private person shall have security for the Payment of any damages
caused to him by another individual." 222 P.2d at 8 (Justice Carter dissenting) (italics

in original).
9. GELLORN, ADMINISTATE LAW: CAsxs AND COMxNTs 274 (2d ed. 1947).
10. Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal. App. 297, 212 Pac. 942 (1922) ; Riley v. Wright,
151 Ga. 609, 107 S.E. 857 (1921) ; Flood v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 25 Ga. App.
455, 103 S.E. 720 (1920) ; Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 Pac. 724 (1922) ; Kalman
v. Walsh, 355 Ill. 341, 189 N.E. 315 (1934); People v. McCoy, 125 Ill., 289, 17
N.E. 786 (1888) ; Miller v. Johnson, 110 Ran. 135, 202 Pac. 619 (1921) ; State ex rel.
Sholund v. Mayor and Common Council of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425, 147 N.W. 820
(1914) ; State v. State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N.W. 238 (1884) ;
Ex pare Heyfron, 7 How. (8 Miss.) 127 (1843); Balling v. Board of Excise of
Elizabeth, 79 N.J.L. 197, 74 At. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; State v. Schultz, 11 Mont. 429,
28 Pac. 643 (1892).
11. See State v. Cote, 122 Me. 450, 120 At. 538 (1923) (license to take lobsters);
Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882) (pool room license); Wallace v.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL,. 5

the category of a contractual right, but is regarded as only a privilege.1 " In
view of this principle, it has been held in cases previous to the instant case
where the question has been the same that there is no right to such a hearing prior to suspension.'3 It is to be noted, however, that the majority of
these cases fall into two categories: (1) where the license was to operate
a vehicle engaged in some occupation peculiar to state or municipal regulation, 14 or (2) where the operator has been adjudged negligent and an unsatisfied judgment is outstanding against him.Y' The court in the principal case
has apparently extended the doctrine to any insolvent driver involved in an
accident, before a judicial determination of fault, and without regard to the
nature of the occupation.
The ultimate objective of financial responsibility laws providing for
summary revocation of the operator's license is to remove financially irresponsible drivers from the highways as quickly as possible.10 While this
may be harmonious with the Constitution, the expense and loss of time imposed upon the operator who is compelled to resort to litigation to rectify
an erroneous suspension or revocation, and in the meantime is without his
driving privileges, seems to be unduly burdensome. Protection of both the
licensee and the public would be assured if the administrator of the act in
each case gave notice to the involved operator of temporary suspension
pending opportunity to be heard on the question whether such suspension
17
should continue.
Mayor, etc. of Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 Pac. 528 (1903) (liquor license) ; People cx rel.
Ritter v. Wallace, 160 App. Div. 787, 145 N.Y. Supp. 1041 (Sup. Ct. 1914) (dance hall
license) ; Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882 (1914) (dance hall license).
12. Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 87 Atl. 1080 (1913); People v. Stryker, 124
Misc. 1, 206 N.Y. Supp. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390,
186 Atl. 65 (1936) ; La Plante v. State Board of Public Roads, 47 R.I. 258, 131 Atl.
641 (1926); 1 BLASHFrELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 211
(1948) ; 1-2 HUDDY, CYcLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 248 (9th ed. 1932) ; see Sullins
v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 472, 135 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1940); Sleeper v. Woodmansee,
11 Cal. App. 2d 595, 54 P.2d 519, 521 (1936). Contra: State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493,
76 P.2d 917 (1938); Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S.E. 516 (1938).
13. Burgess v. Mayor and Aldermen of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N.E. 456
(1920); Romaner v. Williams, 270 App. Div. 948, 62 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2d Dep't 1946);
Mahaney v. Cisco, 248 S.W. 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); see Nutler v. State Road
Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549, 552 (1937). See also BABBITr, MoToR
VEHICLE LAw § 327 (4th ed. 1933) ; 1-2 HUDDY, op. cit. supra note 11, § 248.
14. See Burgess v. Mayor and Aldermen of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N.E. 456
(1920) (bus); Romaner v. Williams, 270 App. Div. 948, 62 N.Y.S.2d (2d Dep't 1946)
(taxi) ; Mahaney v. Cisco, 248 S.W. 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (bus).
15. See Nutler v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
While the question of a preliminary hearing was not litigated in the majority of the
cases in which financial responsibility laws were upheld, all involved an unsatisfied
judgment against the operator as a result of his negligence. See, e.g. State v. Price,
49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653 (1937); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 Atl. 701
(1938) ; Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930 (1940).
16. For an extended discussion of financial responsibility legislation, see Wagner,
Safety Responsibility Laws; A Review of Recent Developments, 9 GA.B.J. 160 (1946);
4 MIAMI L.Q. 502 (1950); 1 STAr.. L. REv. 263 (1949).
17. See GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 9. at 279.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ECONOMIC REGULATION-STATE COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Plaintiffs, owning a self-service gas station, brought suit challenging
the validity of a New Jersey statute prohibiting this method of retailing
gasoline. The lower court found the statute valid. Held (5-2), affirmed. The
statute is a valid exercise of police power to protect the health and safety of
the people and is not violative of due process. Reingold v. Harper,6 N.J. 182,
78 A.2d 54 (1951).
A hairdressing school in Massachusetts charged its voluntary models for
materials used but not for services rendered in hairdressing and manicuring.
The trial court by a declaratory decree held that a statute prohibiting any
charge for the materials was unconstitutional. Held, affirmed. The statute
violates state and federal substantive due process; there is no rational connection with the promotion of public health. Mansfield Beauty Academy, Inc.
v. Board of Registration of Hairdressers,96 N.E.2d 145 (Mass. 1951).
The Commissioner of Education, under authority of a section of the
New York Education Law requiring his approval of the tuition charged by
trade schools, refused to issue a license to plaintiff beauty school, which
brought this action to contest the validity of the statute. The lower court
dismissed the proceedings. Held (3-2), reversed. Tuition in a trade school
is not "affected with a public interest," and any attempt to fix such tuition
by statute is a violation of substantive due process as an unwarranted interference with individual liberty. Grow System School v. Board of Regents,
277 App. Div. 122, 98 N.Y.S.2d 834 (3d Dep't 1950).
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied
by the courts as a limitation on both the substance of state legislation and
the procedure by which it is enforced.' In a recent survey of the effect of
federal interpretation of due process as a substantive limitation of the state
police power, it was concluded that the Supreme Court is tending to restore
the Fourteenth Amendment to the use originally intended,2 which is taken
to be something other than a restriction on state regulation of economic
1. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 Sup. Ct. 652,

94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed.

254 (1921) ; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336 (1917'
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 15 L. Ed. 372 (1856).
2. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAiNST GOVERNMENT (1948). See, for chronological surveys,
(development in England and the
MonT, Dua PROCESS OF LAW 71-192, 300-28 (1926)
colonies) ; Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REv.
366 & 460 (1910) ; Corwin, The Supreme Court and the FourteenthAmendment, 7 MICH.
L. REv. 643 (1909) (contemporary interpretation) ; Brown, Due Process of Law, Police
Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REv. 943 (1927) (emphasizes 1919-27
period); Harris, Due Process of Law, 42 Ami. POL. ScI. REv. 32 (1948) (traces the
concept from 1933 to 1947); Frank, The United' States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18
U. oF Cm. L. Rr,. 1 (1950) (contemporary interpretation of the latest term).
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matters.3 Courts, state and federal, have always declared that there is a
presumption of constitutionality of substantive regulation as against the
restrictions of the due process clause. 4 Statements may be found in practically
any opinion, involving the constitutionality of an economic regulation, to the
effect that the wisdom, expediency or policy of a police regulation does not
give rise to a justiciable question. The courts, however, have differed widely
in their application of these statements; and within the same court, during
different periods, various attitudes have prevailed.
The Supreme Court, from about 1906 to 1937, generally required the
challenger to show that the means adopted were not reasonably related to the
ends desired, in order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. In
the Carolene Products case,5 decided in 1938, the Court declared that it would
strike down an economic regulation only if no state of facts, either known or
reasonably to be assumed, existed to support it. The present court has said
that it will upset substantive regulation only if it is "unreasonable" or
"arbitrary."0 By imposing such standards the Court has effected a shift in
emphasis from the substantive to the procedural due process requirement,
7
retaining its power under this clause.
Contemporary concern has been shown over the fact that some state
courts have not adopted the present federal substantive due process concept
3. See Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 354, 42 Sup.
Ct. 124, 137, 66 L. Ed. 254, 272 (1921).
4. Some writers have said that the presumption of validity meant nothing as a rule;
that the courts cited the presumption to support a statute and hold it constitutional, or
else they proceeded to recite facts which destroyed the validity of the legislation in
question, without reference to the presumption. There is no doubt but that the same
conclusion could be reached in analyzing these cases, but it seems logical to consider
all the cases as treating the presumption with equal reverence. The real problem is
what the courts require to overcome the presumption of the court and the verdict of
the legislature that the statute is constitutional. Warsoff, The Weight of the Presumption of Constitutionality Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 B.U.L. Rv. 319 (1938).
5. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 154, 58 Sup. Ct. 778,
82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938).
6. See, e.g., Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 71
Sup. Ct 215, 95 L. Ed. 190 (1950) ; Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S,
220, 69 Sup. Ct. 550, 93 L. Ed. 632 (1949). See FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THlE
SuPREzim CouRT c.1 (1949); Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due
Process, 4 VAND. L. REv. 446 (1951).
7. The due process clause still has a broad scope in protecting against state action
certain "fundamental" personal rights. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 Sup. Ct.
325, 95 L. Ed. 267 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 Sup. Ct. 303, 95
L. Ed. 295 (1951). See Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L.
REV. 533 (1951).
But the Court has not denied the basic natural-law-due-process formula. Compare,
however, Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 10, 59 Sup. Ct. 15, 83 L. Ed. 6 (1938)1
(dissenting opinion); and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89, 67 Sup. Ct. 1682,
91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Black wants to abandon the
natural-law--due-process formula. His attitude is that to reform economic legislation
the appeal of the individual should be to the ballot-box, not to the court. He would
substitute the specific rights spelled out in the first eight amendments for the natural law.
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as applied to statutes regulating economic activity.8 The economic, social
and political beliefs of some individual judges have tended to cause an overemphasis of substantive due process in many jurisdictions, where use of the
outmoded "reasonably related" test continues.9 There is also a trend in some
states toward relying solely upon the state constitutions.' 0
The principal cases indicate the current views of three leading state
courts on the problem. The New Jersey court decided that the prohibition
of this retailing method in the gasoline industry has a rational basis of fact
that reasonably could be conceived to sustain it," thus indicating an acceptance of the present federal substantive due process concept. The
Massachusetts court uses the rational-basis test of the Carolene Products case,
but apparently without the present Supreme Court's meaning for the words
"unreasonable" and "arbitrary." There is dictum to the effect that
Massachusetts will consider the reasons underlying the passage of the statute and
whether or not the thing prohibited tends to be in the public interest. 12
Perhaps it has not given up the spirit of the older federal decisions.' 3 In the
New York case, the court, relying on previous New York opinions to determine the constitutionality of the statute involved, applied the "affected with
a public interest" test as laid down by Chief Judge Pound in 1933.14 This
could indicate that the New York courts are falling in line with the trend
toward relying solely upon their own state constitution in determining the
effect of the due process clause.' 5
8. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34
(1950).

MINN.

REV. 91

L.

9. E.g., Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania
and most of the Southern states have frankly cited outmoded cases. Typical are: New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (1932)

(based

pursue) ; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336 (1917)

(court

on laissez-faire theory that the state cannot choose any economic policy it wishes to
second-guesses the legislature).

10. See, e.g., Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 375 (Fla.
1949) ; Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N.W.2d 507 (1943) (refusing to follow a

federal decision applying due process to the same statute).
11. This rational basis is the theory that static electricity

is capable of igniting a
combustible mixture, and it is produced when gasoline is poured from one receptacle to

another. To prevent this, the metal nozzle at the end of the gasoline hose should be
held in contact with any metal receptacle which is being filled with gasoline. 74 A.2d at
59. It is very likely no station attendant serving gasoline is familiar with this theory. See
also Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 223, 32 Sup. Ct. 74, 75, 56 L. Ed. 175,

179 (1911) "Legislation cannot be judged by theoretical standards. It must be tested by
the concrete conditions which induced it. .
12. 96 N.E.2d at 146. See Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under
Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1938).
13. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52, Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747
(1932) ; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336 (1917).
14. People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 264, 186 N.E. 694, 696 (1933) ; cf., Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934) (opinion by Mr.
Justice Roberts).
15. People v. Railway Express Agency, 188 Misc. 342, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Ct. Sp.
Sess. 1947), aff'd men., 297 N.Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13 (1947) (applied the outmoded
"reasonably related" test). But cf. People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378. 46 N.E.2d 329 (1943).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN FOR SLUM CLEARANCE
-EFFECT OF SALE OR LEASE OF PROPERTY TO PRIVATE PERSONS
FOR REDEVELOPMENT
A slum clearance statute' provided for the creation of public agencies in
communities where needed to bring about the redevelopment of "blighted
areas." The agencies were to formulate redevelopment plans to be approved
by the municipalities, to acquire slum and other necessary areas, to clear
them and construct streets and other site improvements, and were empowered
to sell or lease land so acquired to other public agencies or private persons
for use in accordance with the redevelopment plan. Pursuant to this statute
the Nashville Housing Authority was duly incorporated. In a declaratory
judgment action the statute was challenged by the Authority as conferring
special benefits on individuals.2 Held, the statute is constitutional. Slum
clearance is a public use even though a transfer to private ownership may
be involved in the process. Nashville Housing Authority v. Nashville, 237
S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1951).
A public use or purpose is necessary to the validity of eminent domain
proceedings, an integral part of slum clearance statutes. 8 The exact meaning
of these terms has been the subject of much controversy. Fundamentally there
are three views. Some courts, interpreting the words strictly, require an actual
public user or ability to use.4 A more liberal approach construes public use
as public benefit or advantage.5 The third view, and that toward which courts
lean today, is somewhere between the two. 6 Slum clearance as a public use
has not been tested to any great extent under the strict rule7 but is
1. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3647.52 et seq. (Williams 1934).
2. The statute was also challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority and an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds for private purposes. The
court upheld the statute against both of these allegations. See Notes, 130 A.L.R. 1082
(1941), 172 A.L.R. 972 (1948), for collections of cases on these questions.
3. In re United States, 28 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1939) ; United States v. 458.95
Acres of Land, 22 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. Pa. 1937); Lamb v. California Water & Telephone Co., 121 P.2d 852 (Cal. App. 1942); Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938) ; Carroll v. Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N.W.
652 (1935) ; Natcher v. Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936) ; Crichton
v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So.2d 229 (1946).
4. See, e.g., Cloth v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 97 Ark. 86, 132 S.W. 1005 (1910);
Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 556, 178 Pac. 150
(1918); Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518
(1927); Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz Lumber Coal Co., 77 Kan. 599, 95 Pac. 559
(1908) ; Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 121, 136 Atl. 664 (1927).
5. See, e.g., Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593,
83 Pac. 464 (1906) ; Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1937) ; New York
City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936); Dornan v.
Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834 (1938); Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transportation Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W.
522 (1913).
6. See 2 NiCHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2[3] (3d ed., Sackman and Van Brunt,
1950) and cases cited therein. It is difficult to state the actual position of this compromise
view.
7. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N.E. 611 (1912), holding
a housing project unconstitutional under the strict rule.
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generally held constitutional under the other approaches." The theory justifying the latter holding is that a public benefit results from the elimination of
crime, disease, and other products of slum areas.9
So long as the public purpose is the principal basis for eminent domain
proceedings, the fact that a private purpose is incidentally served in the
process does not render the condemnation invalid. 10 Should the private use
become primary, however, an incidental public use will not be sufficient to
establish the validity of the proceedings.-" Disposal of the property taken,
even though to a private person, is valid once the public purpose is com2
pleted and the property is no longer needed therefor.1
Putting the redevelopment of blighted areas into the hands of private
enterprise is not a completely new step in the law. As early as 1942 New
York passed a statute so providing. 13 Since then similar statutes have been
enacted in other states, 14 thus indicating a definite trend in this direction.
There has been no set formula for such provisions. New York, for instance,
acting under a constitutional amendment, declared slum clearance a public
purpose and created private redevelopment corporations with the power
of eminent domain in the hands of the municipalities. 15 Pennsylvania, with
a statute which appears to have influenced the passing of the statute in
the instant case,' set up public housing authorities to acquire and clear
8. Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938) ;
Williamson v. Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938) ; Krause
v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 I1l. 356, 19 N.E.2d 193 (1939); Spahn v. Stewart,
268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1937); State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of
New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938); Rutherford v. Great Falls, 107 Mont.
512, 86 P.2d 656 (1939) ; New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333,
1 N.E.2d 153 (1936); Wells v. Housing Authority of Wilmington, 213 N.C. 744, 197
S.E. 693 (1938); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 AtI.
834 (1938) ; McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938) ; 36 MicH. L. REv.
275 (1937).
9. Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1937).
10. "If the use for which land is taken by eminent domain is public, the taking
is not invalid merely because an incidental benefit will enure to private individuals."
2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 447 (3d ed., Sackman and Van Brunt, 1950).
11. RoTTscHAEFFER, CONSTrrUTIiNAL LAW 701 (1939). See also MILLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 13 (2d ed. 1888). But see RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN
THE UNITED STATES § 39 (1894).
12. In re City of Rochester, 137 N.Y. 243, 33 N.E. 320 (1893); 2 NIcHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.223 (3d ed., Sackman and Van Brunt, 1950).
13. N.Y. REDEVELOPMENT COMPANIES LAW §§ 3401 et seq.
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 96 et seq. (Supp. 1949), upheld in Opinion
of the Justices, 254 Ala. 343, 48 So.2d 757 (1950) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c.32, §§ 550.1 et seq.
(Supp. 1950), upheld in Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18a, §§ 1701 et seq. (1945) ; R.I. Pun. LAWS 1946, c.1802, §§ 1 et seq., upheld
in Opinion to the Governor, 69 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1949). But see McCord v. Housing
Authority of Dallas, 234 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), which declares a slum
clearance statute putting redevelopment into the hands of private enterprise unconstitutional, partly as having two purposes. See, in general, Miner, Some Constitutional
Aspects of Housing Legislation, 39 ILL. L. REv. 305 (1945).
15. N.Y. CoNsT. Art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2; N.Y. REDEVELOPMENT COMPANIESLAW §8
3401 et seq.
16. The instant case points out this fact. 237 S.W.2d at 950.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ Vol,. 5

property and then convey to private persons for use in accordance with a
redevelopment plan, compliance to be assured by covenants running with
the land. 7 Illinois has gone even further by placing the power of eminent
domain in the private redevelopment corporation itself.' s
Two questions arise. First, what, if any, restrictions are placed on private
enterprise in such redevelopment? Second, what will be the effect of this trend
on the public use doctrine?
So far, all of the states have placed some limitations on conveyances
to private persons for redevelopment. In Tennessee, for example, the uses of
the land by private persons must conform to the redevelopment plan. This
plan in turn must be approved by the municipality, must show its relationship to local objectives such as public improvements, and must indicate
proposed land uses and building requirements in the area.10 Other states
require the private persons to conform to varying requirements of housing
or redevelopment commissions. 20 These limitations render it unlikely that
the land will be used unreasonably. However, the use is not necessarily limited
to housing alone. Parks, hospitals, recreation centers and even industrial
projects are not expressly beyond the scope of the use if they can be shown
to be within the scope of redevelopment plans.2 ' The mere fact that the
enjoyment of the actual fruits of the project may be confined to a limited
22
number does not destroy the public character of the improvement.
Redevelopment of slum areas by private enterprise does not constitute an
extension of the public use doctrine. It has been reasoned that when the slums
are, cleared the public use is completed and the property may be disposed of
as seems best. 23 But even without this argument the benefit accruing to the
public from slum clearance and redevelopment is sufficiently important to
uphold eminent domain proceedings as not conferring private, special benefits
of a primary nature.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has long since indicated a readiness to
24
expand the public use doctrine to achieve such results should it be necessary.
Entrusting these activities to private enterprise perhaps represents a most effective method of attacking the slum threat to population centers, and this case
evidences Tennessee's intent to follow the trend in that direction.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a, §§ 1701 et seq. (1945).
18. ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 32, §§ 550.1 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3647.55, 3647.56 (Williams 1934).
20. See notes 13, 14 supra.
21. People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 68 N.E.2d 761 (1946) ; Schenck
v. Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950).
22. Knoxville Housing Authority v. Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76, 123 S.W.2d 1085 (1939).
23. Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d
277 (1947).
24. Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 50 S.W. 744 (1899).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSSTATE SALES TAX ON INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DEALING WITH
FEDERAL AGENCY WHOSE "ACTIVITIES" ARE EXEMPTED
Two corporations and their vendors sued the Commissioner of Finance
and Taxation to recover sales and use taxes paid under protest, the United
States filing a petition of intervention. The corporations are cost-type contractors engaged in the operation of Government owned atomic production
facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. From a judgment in favor of the Commissioner the plaintiffs appealed. Held, reversed. The Atomic Energy Act
of 1946,1 exempting "activities" of the commission from state and local
taxation, precludes a state tax on the purchase and use of materials by cost-

type contractors. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Carson, 239 S.W.2d
27 (Tenn. 1951).
The doctrine of implied immunity2 exempts the Federal Government and
its agencies and instrumentalities from the burden of state and local taxation.
Originally the theory was that the existence of a power to tax at all would
potentially destroy the Federal Government. The idea now is that it would at
least burden, impede. and retard the Government in its operation.3 However,
this broad doctrine has been so greatly modified by judicial decision that its
precise limits are rather obscure. 4 The more recent trend has been toward
the elimination of the large class of tax-exempt persons and thingsY
In recent years there has been an increasing number of governmental
activities, many of which are carried out by independent contractors retained
by the Government on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. Many of these contractors
have claimed exemption from state sales and use taxes on the basis of the
1. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1809(b) (Supp. 1951).
2. The theory underlying this doctrine is that a state may not unduly burden or
impair the effective functioning of the Federal Government or its instrumentalities.
There is no express language of this character in the Constitution, but it has been
judicially developed as an inference from the necessities of a dual system of government.
BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 159 (3d ed. 1910); ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 96-110 (1939); Powell, Indirect Encroachment on the Federal Authority by the
Taxing Power of the States, 31 HARv. L. Rv. 321 (1918); Notes, 140 A.L.R. 621, 622
(1942), 22 B.U.L. REv. 120, 122 (1942).
3. BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 159 (3d ed. 1910); RorrscHAxFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-10 (1939).
4. See Tirrell v. Johnston, 86 N.H. 530, 171 Atl. 641, 649 (1934). See also Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Power of the States,
31 HARV. L. RFv. 321. 322 (1918) ; Note, 140 A.L.R. 621, 622 (1942).
5. See Notes, 140 A.L.R. 621 (1942), 22 B.U.L. REv. 120 (1942), 51 YALE L.J.
482 (1942). "[I]t is apparent that not every person who uses his property or derives
a profit, in his dealings with the government, may clothe himself with immunity from
taxation on the theory that either he or his property is an instrumentality of the
government within the meaning of the rule." Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514,
522, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. Ed. 384 (1925).
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doctrine of implied immunity." Their contention was that the "economic
burden" of the tax ultimately fell on the Federal Government, and it was
therefore in effect a tax on the Federal Government. The leading case is
Alabama v. King & Boozer,7 in which the Supreme Court rejected the
"economic burden" test s and held that a sales tax on the contractor's vendor
is a normal cost borne by the Government. The King & Boozer case and
others deciding the same question0 emphasize the absence of a specific congressional exemption with respect to a tax on "cost-plus" contractors for the
construction of Government projects.10
The court in the instant case found that these contractors in their
relationship with the Government were independent contractors and not
agents.11 Despite this finding the court distinguished the present problem
from that in the King & Boozer case on the theory that the Atomic Energy
Act, 12 exempting the "activities" of the commission, provides a specific
legislative exemption to the contractors. It was reasoned that since there
was no need to pass legislation exempting the commission and since there
is a presumption that Congress does not pass useless legislation, it must
6. See, e.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer Co., 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed.
3, 140 A.L.R. 615 (1941); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466,
54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v. Lee, 145 Fla. 385, 199 So.
325 (1940) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Fontenot, 198 La. 644, 4 So.2d 634 (1941).
7. 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
8. The "economic burden" test condemns a state tax when applied so that the

incidence of its economic burden is upon the Federal Government. Other tests that
have received consideration are: (1) the "degree" test, tinder which the court attempts
to determine whether a state tax affects the operations of the Federal Government
directly or remotely; (2) the "discrimination" test, whereby the validity of a state tax
is judged according to whether it discriminates against the Federal Government; (3)
the "legal incidence" test, in which the court looks to see whether the legal incidence
of a state tax is upon the Federal Government; and (4) what may be called the "Federal
or governmental status" test, under which the right to immunity from state taxation depends upon the federal or governmental status of particular entities and operations affected
by the tax. Note, 140 A.L.R. 621, 622 (1942).
9. Currey v. United States, 314 U.S. 14, 62 Sup. Ct. 48, 86 L. Ed. 9 (1941), a
companion case to Alabama v. King & Boozer Co., supra, decided the same question
and applied the same reasoning to a state use tax as the King & Boozer case did to a
state sales tax.
10. See Note, 140 A.L.R. 621, 635 (1942).
11. Where this relationship is found to exist the trend has been to impose the tax
in the absence of a clear and specific exemption. See e.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer
Co., 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615 (1941); Silas Mason Co.
v. Tax Comm'r of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 58 Sup. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 187 (1937);
Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed.
918 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v. Lee, 145 Fla. 385, 199 So. 325 (1940); Boeing
Airplane Co. v. State Comm'r of Rev. & Taxation, 153 Kan. 712, 113 P.2d 110 (1941) ;
Standard Oil Co. v. Fontenot, 198 La. 644, 4 So.2d 634 (1941). But cf. Graves v. Texas
Co., 298 U.S. 393, 56 Sup. Ct. 818, 80 L. Ed. 1236 (1936); Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857 (1928).
12. ". . . The Commission and the property, activities and income of the commission, are hereby expressly exempted from taxation in any manner or form by any
state, county, municipality, or any subdivision thereof." 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1809(b) (Supp. 1951).
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have meant by this provision to exempt the contractors. 13 The decision
appears contrary to the modern trend towards the elimination of the large
class of tax-exempt persons and things.
The general rule is that tax statutes will be construed strictly in favor
of the taxpayer. 14 When a statute purports to grant an exemption from
taxation, however, the normal rule of construction is to construe the exemption provision strictly against the one asserting the claim of exemption, in
the absence of any expression of legislative intent to the contrary. 15 There
is an exception to the latter rule as to public property. If a state purports to
levy a tax on public property, the rule of construction is to construe the
exemption liberally in favor of the one claiming the exemption.' 6 However,
an examination of the provisions of the contracts in the instant case indicates that the property purchased by these contractors was not public
property. They provide that title to articles acquired under the contracts
should pass to the Government at a point designated by the Government
contracting officer. 7 The provisions of the contracts and the procedure for
transferring the goods to the Government closely resemble those of the King
& Boozer case, in which it was found that the vendor first transferred title
8
to the contractors who later transferred title to the Government.'
Had Congress wished to exempt these contractors, it would have been
a simple matter f~r it to have done so by using explicit language to that
effect. In the absence of such language it is difficult to assume that Congress
intended to depart from a well established policy.

CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF PROOF OF COMPLETED CRIME ON
CHARGE OF ATTEMPT-FATAL VARIANCE
Defendant was charged with the crime of attempting to procure an
abortion. The prosecuting witness had slipped on a stairway but had not
fallen. Undisputed testimony offered by the defendant indicated that the
defendant's acts performed on the prosecutrix rather than her accident caused
the miscarriage. Defendant was convicted for the attempt and appealed.
Held, reversed. Under the Illinois statute, attempting to procure an abortion
13. 239 S.W.2d at 37. The dissent emphasized that it is only by implication that
the majority of the court reached the conclusion that Congress intended to exempt these
contractors. 239 S.W.2d at 39.
14. 2 CooLEY, TAXATIo0x § 503 (4th ed. 1924).
15. Id. § 672; Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEXAs L. REv. 385, 388 (1929).
16. 2 COOLEY, TAXATIO.N § 673 (4th ed. 1924); Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes,
7 TEXAS L. REv. 385 (1929).
17. 239 S.W.2d at 32.
18. Alabama v. King & Boozer Co., 314 U.S. 1, 9, 63 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
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and causing an abortion are two distinct crimes. It is fatal variance to charge
an attempt when the proof indicates that the crime was completed. People
v. Stanko, 95 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1951).
An attempt at common law consisted of two elements: (1) intent to
commit the crime; (2) an act looking towards and coming dangerously close
to the completion of the crime. The act had to be ineffectual.1 Thus it
was generally held that where there was a charge of attempt and the proof
established the completed crime, there had to be an acquittal. 2 The position
of Professor Beale is indicative of the view stressing individual rights at the
turn of the century. "If an attempt succeeds it cannot be punished as an
attempt; for in the nature of things a mere attempt must be unsuccessful." 3
The rule seems to be based on pure logic.
Most states that have been confronted with this understandably infrequent situation have shown a strong tendency in the last 35 years to
4
abandon the common law doctrine, either by statute or judicial decision.
In 1928 the Michigan Supreme Court expressly refuted the Illinois and
common law rule, stating that it was not a general rule and would not be
recognized in that jurisdiction. 5 The new Uniform Code of Military justice,
which became effective May 31, 1951, expresses the latest view. It provides,
"An accused may be convicted on an attempt to commit an offense although
it appears at the trial that the crime was consummated."'' Both New York1
and California$ have statutes similar to the Uniform Code. The modern
trend is based primarily upon the propositions that a defendant suffers no
injury or prejudice by this result, and that the same evidence is involved
in proving both the attempt and the completed crime.0
1. United States v. Quincy, 6 Pet. 445 (U.S. 1832)

(unlawful fitting out of an

armed vessel) ; Kelsey v. State, 62 Ga. 558 (1879) (rape) ; People v. Lardner, 300 Ill.
264, 133 N.E. 375, 19 A.L.R. 721 (1921) (larceny); WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 279
(12th ed. 1932); 14 Amt. JuR., Criminal Law § 65 (1938) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL,
CRIzMEs 157 (4th ed. 1940).
2. People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N.E. 375, 19 A.L.R. 721 (1921). See Beale,
Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REv. 491 (1903).
3. Beale, supra note 2, at 507.
4. See notes 6, 7, 8, 11 infra.
5. People v. Baxter, 245 Mich. 229, 222 N.W. 149 (1928) (bribery) ; see People v.
Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560, 561 (1943) (larceny). See MIcu. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.984 (1938).
6. 64 STAT. 134 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 674 (Supp. 1950). The broad authority on
which this code is based is the Constitution and International Law.
7.-N. Y. PEN. LAW § 260. See People v. Wasserbach, 184 Misc. 589, 54 N.Y.S2d
302 (Co. Ct. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 271 App. Div. 756, 64 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2nd
Dep't 1946). The court said this provision does not deprive the defendant of his right
to dismiss the indictment before trial.
8. CAL. PEN. CODE § 663 (1949) (enacted 1872). Cf. People v. McConnell, 80 Cal.
App. 789, 252 Pac. 1068 (1927) (burglary); People v. Vanderbilt, 199 Cal. 461, 249
Pac. 867 (1926) (sodomy); People v. Horn, 25 Cal. App. 583, 144 Pac. 641 (1Q14)
(rape).
9. Note 18 in!ra.
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It is the theory in most recent cases that an attempt is merged with
the completed crime. The two are not so distinct as to be incapable of
merger. What little primary authority there is in Tennessee indicates that
0
the courts would probably include the attempt within the completed crime.'
This same indication is evidenced in other states by decisions upholding
The
convictions for attempt where the completed crime was charged."
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an attempt is part of the
offense.12
The Illinois court interprets the abortion statute' 3 in the instant case
to mean that "causing an abortion and attempting to procure an abortion
are separate and distinct offenses.' 4 Three cases' 5 are cited to support the
holding. They all deal with the problem of indictment for the crime and
6
conviction for the attempt. One of the cases cited' actually upheld the
conviction, and the whole tenor of the opinion was against the reasoning in
the present case. Other Illinois statutes have been interpreted by the court
as merging the attempt in the crime.' 7 Had the court in the instant case
desired to follow the modern trend it could have found some support in its
own decisions.
Difficulties in reasoning arise in trying to understand how the actual
physical elements of attempt are not included in the completed crime. The
10. See Rice v. State, 166 Tenn. 571, 64 S.W.2d 19 (1933) (bank robbery).
11. See, e.g., Blakeney v. State, 244 Ala. 262, 13 So.2d 430 (1943) (larceny);
Rogers v. State, 22 Ala. App. 410, 117 So. 409 (1928) (illegal manufacture of whisky);
Compton v. People, 84 Colo. 106, 268 Pac. 577 (1928) (aid in escaping prison) ; Foster
v. State, 70 Ga. App. 305, 28 S.E.2d 81 (1943) (illegal sale of whisky) ; Acton v. State,
201 Ind. 686, 171 N.E. 197 (1930) (rape) ; State v. Allen, 163 Kan. 374, 183 P.2d 458
(1947) (rape); Nider v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 684, 131 S.W. 1024, Ann. Cas. 1913E
1246 (1910) (rape) ; Petition of Carson, 144 Me. 132, 39 A.2d 756, (indecent liberties
with a female child) (1944); State v. Miller, 322 Mo. 1199, 18 S.W.2d 492 (1929)
(felonious stealing) ; State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511, 139 A.L.R. 614
(1941) (barratry) ; State v. Schwarzbach, 84 N.J.L. 268, 86 Atl. 423 (1913) (adultery) ;
State v. Baltimore, 90 Ohio St. 196, 107 N.E. 334 (1914) (rape) ; State v. Prince, 75
Utah 205, 284 Pac. 108 (1930) (extortion) ; Lee v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 594, 131
S.E. 212 (1926) (murder) ; State v. Collins, 108 W. Va. 98, 150 S.E. 369, (1929) (rape).
12. FED. R. CPir. P. 31(c).
13. "Whoever, by means of an instrument, medicine, drug or other means whatever,
causes any woman, pregnant with child to abort or miscarry, or attempts to procure
or produce an abortion or miscarriage, unless the same were done as necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than
one year nor more than ten years; or if the death of the mother results therefrom, the
person causing the abortion or miscarriage shall be guilty of murder." ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 38, § 3 (1935).
14. 95 N.E2d at 862.
15. People v. Hagenow, 334 Ill. 341, 166 N.E. 65 (1929) (murder by abortion);
People v. Heisler, 300 Il. 98, 132 N.E. 802 (1921) (murder by abortion); Clark v.
554, 79 N.E. 941 (1906) (murder by abortion).
People, 224 Ill.
16. Clark v. People, supra note 15. Carter J. states: "It is evident that the information demanded by the indictment does not require it to be given with technical
minuteness, but only with that reasonable accuracy and clearness that will apprise the
defendant of what he is charged." 79 N.E. at 943.
17. See, e.g., People v. Katz, 356 Ill. 440, 190 N.E. 913 (1934) (forgery).
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absence of reality in such a proposition has been recognized in this country
for many years, 18 and the scarcity of cases on this particular situation during
the last two decades might indicate that in most jurisdictions attorneys no
longer regard the common law rule as a defense. Why should the state be
penalized and the defendant benefited when the latter happens to be successful in a criminal attempt, especially when, as in this case, the success or
failure of the acts was determinable only at the trial by expert testimony?
The state had no apparent means of knowng whether to charge the attempt
or the crime. These instances might have afforded a basis for upholding the
decision of the lower court here and for the abandonment of a precedent
that increases the expense and time of litigation without a corresponding
enhancement of criminal justice and efficiency.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-FORUM NON CONVENIENS-STAY OF
FEDERAL ACTION PENDING STATE DECISION
Duke Laboratories sued Beiersdorf in the state court of Connecticut
asking for a declaratory judgment that certain trade-marks issued to Beiersdorf were the property of Duke and consequently could not have been
infringed by it. Two months later Beiersdorf sued Duke in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York for infringement of
trade-marks and unfair competition. Duke moved for a transfer to the Federal
District Court of Connecticut or in the alternative for a stay of these proceedings in the federal court. Judge McGohey ordered a stay of the federal
court action pending determination of the state court proceeding. Beiersdorf
then petitioned the court of appeals for leave to file a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel Judge McGohey to vacate the stay order. Held (2-1),
petition for writ of mandamus denied. P. Beiersdorf & Co., Inc., v. McGohey,
Judge, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951).
The majority opinion by Judge Jerome Frank in the instant case2 is
based on what he calls the "sweeping rationale" of the case of Mottolese v.
Kaufman,3 where he wrote a strong dissent. He does not in his present
opinion further enlarge on the meaning of this "sweeping rationale."
18. See People v. Horn, 25 Cal. App. 583, 144 Pac. 641, 645 (1914), where Hart,
J., states ". . . evidence of its perpetration necessarily involves evidence of an attempt
to perpetrate it, for it is not conceivable that any crime can be committed in the absence
of an attempt to commit it."
1. Opinion by Frank,

3. (Chase, J. concurring) ; dissenting opinion by Clark, J.

2. Though he wrote the majority opinion, Judge Frank disagrees with the result,

"hoping that the Supreme Court, recognizing an intra-circuit conflict, will grant review
and reverse this decision. . . ." 187 F.2d at 15.
3. 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
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In the Mottolese case two stockholders' derivative suits in federal courts
were stayed pending the determination by a state court of a consolidated
action against the same defendants on behalf of the safne corporation. The
stay order was held on appeal to be a proper exercise of the federal court's
discretion to stay. This discretion was based on the familiar doctrine of
forum non conveniens,4 whereby a court may refuse to exercise existing
jurisdiction because it finds it more convenient or less expensive for the
action to be tried elsewhere.9 While a party urging the stay had to show "some
positive reason" why the federal plaintiff's choice of a forum was not a
good one, the fact that "equity has always interfered to prevent multiplicity
of suits" is reason enough for the court to grant a stay in the absence of any
showing by the plaintiff that the eventual decision could be reached faster
in the federal court, or that the requirement that plaintiff sue in a state.
court would deprive him of procedural advantages. 6
The instant case presents an opportunity to determine what effect the
holding in the Mottolese case has outside of the particular fact situation
there.7 Particularly, the question is whether the court in the instant case
should have considered itself completely bound by the Mottolese holding.8
The particular application given to the doctrine of forum non conveniens by
the court in the Mottolese case is rather broad and was vigorously criticized
in the dissenting opinion.9 The federal jurisdiction in Mottolese arose out
of the diversity of citizenship provison in the Judicial Code.' 0 However, this
is quite another matter from a suit for trade-mark infringement and unfair
4. The court pointed out that Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct.
839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947); and Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 Sup. Ct. 828, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1947), establish the doctrine of
forum no) conveniens insofar as one federal court may stay its own proceedings where
the action could have been brought more conveniently in another federal court. This
doctrine has now been codified, with provisions for transfer. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)
(1950). These cases, then according to Judge Hand, are authority for the proposition
".. . that a federal action depending on diverse citizenship is always subject to the
plea, forum non conveniens; and from these it follows that a federal suit, which has
been brought after a state suit, may be stayed, for we can see no difference in kind
between the inconveniences which may arise from compelling a defendant to staffd trial
at a distance from the place where the transactions have occurred, and compelling him
to defend another action on the same claim." Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303
(2d Cir. 1949).
5. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947);
Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 Sup. Ct.
828, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1947).
6. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949).
7. This question has been previously posed: 63 HAyv. L. Rm,. 893 (1950) ; 25 IND.

L.J. 365 (1950).

8. But cf. Judge Clark's dissent: "...
I should regard it as a highly novel proposition that a minority of a large court, not sitting en banc, could bind all not merely on
points actually decided, but upon possibilities not briefed or argued or carefully analyzed
in any concrete setting." 187 F.2d at 17.
9. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion by
Judge Frank) ; 38 GEo. L.J. 303, 304-05 (1950).
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1949).
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competition, based on the federal statute" where the jurisdiction of federal
courts is exclusive of that of state courts.' This distinction between the
two cases would furnish a basis for the court in the instant case to avoid the
sweeping rationale of Mottolese as it pertains to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
There does not seem to be any authority for the proposition that a
federal action should be stayed pending a state action for the sole reason
that this is in conformity with the policy against multiplicity of suits. It
is true that oppressiveness and vexation to the defendant may be important
considerations for the court in exercising its discretion,' 3 but no such facts
are asserted in either the M1ottolese or the Beiersdorf cases. By way of
analogy, the Supreme Court has stated with regard to a federal court's
exercising its general equity powers that "Where the multiplicity of suits
to be feared consists in repetitions of suits by the same prson against the
plaintiff for causes of action arising out of the same facts and legal principles, a court of equity ought not to interfere upon that ground unless it is
clearly necessary to protect the plaintiff from continued and vexatious
litigation."'1 4 Along this same line, it might be noted that the usual situation
where vexatious litigation occurs is where the plaintiff, with one action pending, brings suit in another court on the same facts. In the instant case the
plaintiff was being sued as a defendant in the state court.
The doctrine espoused by Judge Learned Hand in Mottolese was attacked in the dissenting opinion there on grounds that the defendant himself
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (1950).
12. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (1950).
13. Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 07
Sup. Ct. 828, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1947). Other facts may be shown to influence the court
in its discretion. These facts may show advantages in one forum or the other to the
court itself. Thus in Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., supra,
the court points out that a plaintiff's choice can be

".

.

. inappropriate because of

considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems." Cf. Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-9, 67 Sup. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947). More
generally, however, the examination is made with regard to the comparative advantages
to the parties themselves. In certain situations a design by one party merely to
frustrate the other will be foiled. See Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y.
1942), 59 YALE L.J. 991 (1950). A considerable economic waste involved in two trials
of the same cause of action will be considered. Butler v. Judge of U.S. District Court,
116 F.2d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 1941); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. Duke Laboratories, Inc.,
92 F. Supp. 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; cf. Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d
925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941). And both substantive and procedural consequences to one or
both parties may be considered. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 Sup.
Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947) (procedural) ; Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 51 Sup.
Ct. 243, 75 L. Ed. 520 (1931) (substantive); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1949) (procedural) ; Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (substantive).
14. Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City. 213 U.S. 276. 286, 29
Sup. Ct. 426, 53 L. Ed. 796 (1909). See also, DiGiovanni v. Camden Fire Insurance
Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 70-72, 56 Sup. Ct. 1, 80 L. Ed. 47 (1935) ; Union Central Life Ins.
Co. v. McAden, 21 F. Supp. 110, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
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was responsible for the failure to consolidate the two federal court actions. 15
However, the Mottolese case slould be distinguished from Beiersdorf since
in the latter there was only one other suit considered by the court in ordering
its stay. 16 Judge Frank's refusal to distinguish Mottolese from Beiersdorf
means that every case where a court would be asked to stay the action before it, pending the determination of a state suit, would necessarily involve
multiplicity. This seems contrary to Judge Hand's intentions in Mottolese,
where he contemplates that at least some federal actions would be allowed
17
to continue.
Furthermore, the interpretation of Mottolese urged by Judge Frank puts
the burden of proving convenience upon the plaintiff, rather than putting the
burden of proving inconvenience upon the defendant, as is urged by some very
respectable authorities, including the United States Supreme Court.18 There
would seem, then, to be considerable ground for distinguishing the instant
case from Mottolese v. Kaufman, both on the application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, and on the use of "multiplicity of suits" as a criterion
for determining whether a stay order was proper.

INSANE PERSONS-COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS-REQUIREMENT
OF REASONABLE NOTICE
Petitioner's family instituted proceedings to have him committed, to the
State Mental Hospital. Upon recommendation of his family, notice was not
served upon him until two hours before the time set for the hearing. At the
hearing, the court appointed an attorney to represent petitioner and upon
the evidence he was adjudged violently insane and his commitment was
ordered. Alleging a lack of proper notice, petitioner sought writ of habeas
corpus. Held, the two-hours notice given to petitioner was reasonable under
the circumstances. Klehischmidt v. Hoctor, 233 S.W.2d .649 (Mo. 1950).
15. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1949).
16. Actually there were two suits between the same parties in the instant case other
than the suits heretofore concerned, one being to compel arbitration of a contract,
P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 94 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd
inem., 277 App. Div. 768, 97 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1950), aff'd iner., 301 N.Y. 707, 95 N.E.2d
55 (1950); and another still in litigation in Connecticut against the officers of the
Beiersdorf Company. Neither of these was apparently considered pertinent to the
discussion by the writer of the majority opinion in the court of appeals or the opinion
of the district court. Likewise, neither would be affected by the court's action in staying
the proceeding in the federal district court.
17. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949).
18. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255-56. 57 Sup. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153
(1936) ; Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524,
67 Sup. Ct. 828, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1947) ; Ratner v. Paramount Pictures. Inc.. 46 F. Supp.
339, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); cf. Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co.. 316 U.S. 491, 500,
62 Sup. Ct. 1173, 86 L. Ed. 1620 (1942) (dissent by Justice Stone); Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissent by Judge Frank).
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The primary purpose of notice in a sanity hearing is to enable a person
to be present at the hearing and to be prepared to protect his interests.1 The
requirement of notice in criminal proceedings where the accused's sanity is
to be determined is definitely established. But in noncriminal proceedings for
commitment of insane persons, the courts are not in agreement as to the
necessity for notice.2
Until recently, the safeguards provided by law for the protection of the
personal liberty of the alleged insane were few, and only in the last 25 years
have the various state legislatures given the problem careful consideration.3
jury trial, 4 right to counsel 5 and due and reasonable notice to the accused"
have been provided for by statute. These were claimed to be essential requirements of due process set forth by both state and federal constitutions. The
need for reasonable notice, however, has seemed to provide the greatest
impetus for legislation, and at the present time practically every state has
considered the problem. An analysis of the legislation regarding notice
before hearing to the alleged insane person reveals that a majority of the
states provide for some form of notice,7 while in a few none is required.8
The statutes in these latter states generally have been upheld as constitutional.9
Where the statutory requirement is "reasonable notice," the courts are
not in agreement as to what "reasonableness" satisfies due process. 10 The
Supreme Court, along with various state courts, has said that it is largely
1. See A

CONFERENCE, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM
61 (1950).
2. See Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally I1, 24 TExAs L.
REV. 307 (1946).
3. See Note, 56 YALE L.J. 1197 (1947).
4. Johnson v. Nelms, 171 Tenn. 54, 100 S.W.2d 648 (1937).
5. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5550 (1925).
6. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grove v. Jackson, 16 F. Supp. 126 (M.D. Pa.
1936); Rice v. Gray, 225 Mo. App. 890, 34 S.W.2d 567-71 (1931) ; Brewer v. Griggs,
10 Tenn. App. 378 (M.S. 1929).
7. See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 8-301 (1939) (reasonable notice); CAL. PRon.
CODE ANN. § 1461 (1949) (five days notice); MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 14811 (Supp.
1947) (24 hours). Tennessee specifically provides for five days personal notice, informing the alleged incompetent of the time and place of hearing. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9626
(Michie 1938); Brewer v. Brewer, 19 Tenn. App. 209, 84 S.W.2d 1022 (M.S. 1933).
See also, Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378 (M.S. 1929).
8. See e.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c.105, § 3 (1935) ; NER. REv. STAT. § 83-325 (Supp.
1949); Corcoran v. Jerrel, 185 Iowa 532, 170 N.W. 776, 2 A.L.R. 1579 (1919); cf.
State e- rel. Sathre v. Roberts, 67 N.D. 92, 269 N.W. 913, 919 (1936). See Note, 2
A.L.R. 1582 (1919).
9. Paul v. Longino, 197 Ga. 110, 28 S.E.2d 286 (1943). Compare Hiatt v. Souce, 240
Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949), with Chavannes v. Priestly, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N.W.
766, 9 L.R.A. 193 (1890).
10. For a general discussion see Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 307, 319 (1946); Note, 3 STAN. L. REV. 109, 117
REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS'

OF THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES

(1950).
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a discretionary matter to be determined by the particular court on the facts of
each case." In several cases the courts have been inclined to construe the
expression favorably to the person whose sanity is in question and to require
strict compliance with the requirements.' 2 Thus it has been held that notice
is not legally served by the mere reading of it to the person by a nurse in
the state mental hospital, when the statute required service by the sheriff ;13
and that where statutory service was not complied with, appearance of an
attorney appointed by the court to represent the alleged insane person did
not satisfy the requirement of notice. 14 In the few states prescribing a
definite statutory period, the requirements vary from 24 hours to three days. 15
When it is found as a fact, preliminary to the actual hearing, that the
person to be committed is violently insane, the majority view allows immediate
commitment without notice, pending a later judicial inquiry. 16 The commitment order, however, must show either that proper notice was given or that
notice v'as properly dispensed with because of violent insanity. 17
In the present case the evidence indicated that the petitioner was
violently insane.' s Despite this fact, the majority opinion reasoned that two
hours wai "reasonable notice" under the circumstances. 19 The dissent argues
that a lax interpretation of the provision in the commitment statute requiring
reasonable notice will enhance the possibility of "railroading" sane persons
into mental institutions by families or relatives. The Missouri statutes20
are broad enough to protect both the individual's right to personal liberty and
the public safety. One statute requires "reasonable notice" to be given to one
not believed violently insane. 21 A second one permits immediate commitment
11. See, e.g., Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 21 Sup. Ct. 836, 45 L. Ed. 1165 (1901) ;
Hall v. Verdel, 40 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Va. 1941); United States ex tel. Grove v.
Jackson, 16 F. Supp. 126 (M.D. Pa. 1936) ; Shapley v. Cohoon, 258 Fed. 752 (D. Mass.
1918) ; Ex parte Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 Atl. 1078, 26 L.R.A. (N.s.) 232 (1909). Contra:
In re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851, 55 L.R.A. 856, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296 (1901).
12. See, e.g., Shields v. Shields, 26 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Mo. 1939); Ruckert v.
Moore, 217 Mo. 228, 295 S.W. 794 (1927).
13. Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 127 S.W.2d 410 (1939) ; accord, Skelly v. The
Maccabees, 217 Mo. App. 333, 272 S.W. 1089 (1927).
14. Skelly v. The Maccabees, 217 Mo. App. 333, 272 S.W. 1089 (1927).
15. See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14811 (Supp. 1947) (24 hours); TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5561a (1925) (three days).
16. See, e.g., lit re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033, 61 Am. St. Rep. 290
(1897); Ex parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699, 44 L.R.A. (N.s.) 389 (1912);
In re Crosswell's Petition, 28 R.I. 137, 66 Atl. 55, 13 Ann. Cas. 874 (1907). See also
note 9 supra.
17. Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 At. 169, 39 L.R.A. 353 (1898). This is
true despite the fact that the person might have appeared personally. Albright v.
Rader, 81 Tenn. 574 (1884).
18. 233 S.W.2d at 655.
19. See State ex rel. Terry v. Holtkamp, 330 Mo. 608, 51 S.W.2d 13 (1932) (notice
served on the day of the hearing was not reasonable, but person was not violently insane).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 449, 9336 (West 1950).
21. Id. § 449.
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22
of a violently insane person, provided a hearing with notice is later given.
The court in this instance has combined the two statutes into a judicial
hybrid. The result is that the "reasonable notice" statute is reduced to almost
insignificance, and is then combined with the immediate commitment statute
to provide the basis for the present decision.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY-PUBLICATION OF PICTURES AS OFFENSE TO
"ORDINARY SENSIBILITIES"-QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT?
In its magazine, Harper'sBazaar, defendant publisher used a picture of
plaintiffs, husband and wife, taken without their knowledge or consent and
showing the husband with his arm around his wife. Defendant later authorized the Ladies' Home Journal to use the same picture to illustrate an article
in the Journal on "love." The picture was used to illustrate the "wrong"
kind of love, described as "100 per cent intense sex attraction." In a suit
against the publisher of the Journal for invasion of the right of privacy,
plaintiffs were successful." In a similar suit against defendant, however,
plaintiffs' complaint against defendant for its publication of the picture in
Harper's Bazaar was dismissed because barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs then amended their complaint, basing it solely upon the authorization given by defendant to the Journal publishers. Defendant's demurrer
thereto was sustained and plaintiffs appealed. Held (2-1), affirmed. The
picture, when taken by itself and apart from the verbal context, is not such
as could have caused any disturbance of plaintiffs' minds and feelings for
which an action may be had for invasion of the right of privacy. Gill v.
Hearst Pub. Co., 231 P. 2d 570 (Cal. App. 1951).
Most American jurisdictions which have considered the problem now
recognize the right of privacy in one form or another. 2 At one time, the
22. Id. § 9336.
1. Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 231 P.2d 565 (Cal. App. 1951).
2. E.g., Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Smith v. Doss,
251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948) ; Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162
P.2d 133 (1945); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Cason v.
Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243, 168 A.L.R. 430 (1944) ; Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101, 2 Ann. Cas. 561 (1905); FosterMilburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364, 34 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1137 (1909); Barber
v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,
212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) ; Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d
438, 138 A.L.R. 1 (1941). For complete collection of cases, see Notes, 138 A.L.R. 22
(1942), 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950). See also Dickler, The Right
of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S.L. REv. 435 (1936); Feinberg, Recent
Developments it the Law of Privacy, 48 COL. L. Ray. 713 (1948); Green, The Riqht
of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. Ray. 237 (1932); Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 B.U.L.
REy. 353, 600 (1932) ; Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky. L.J. 137
(1931); Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MiNN.
L. REv. 734 (1948); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, A Half Century's Developments,
39 MlCHa. L. Rav. 526 (1941); Ragland, The Right of Privacy, 17 KY. L.J. 85 (1929).

1951 ]

RECENT CASES

protection afforded to plaintiffs in fact situations of this type was almost
4
2
entirely on the basis of property rights or implied contractual rights. The
tendency of the vast majority of recent cases, however, is to predicate the
right upon a separately existing interest in the personality itself--i.e., the
individual's own feelings with regard to his privacy.5 Obviously, a great many
cases, including the instant one, have a commercial aspect to them, which
borders upon a property concept. This may be true whether the invasion
complained of is clearly for the purpose of securing a commercial advantage,
as where plaintiff's picture or name is used in an advertisement, or whether
the commerciality is only secondary, as in the case of a newspaper story or
a motion picture. Nevertheless, these cases have consistently emphasized the
6
plaintiff's injured feelings rather than the defendant's profit. This interest
in the personality must also be distinguished from that which the individual
has in his reputation, which is protected by the law of defamation. There

should, therefore, be no doubt that a picture alone, accompanied by no com7
inent, could constitute an actionable invasion, since the courts are not concerned with the effect of defendant's tortious acts upon third persons, but
only with their effect upon the plaintiff's own feelings., The truth of the
disclosure does not constitute a defense to an action for invasion of the right
9
of privacy, as it does in actions for defamation.
The instant case presents the problem of determining when publication
of a picture has caused enough damage to plaintiffs' feelings to entitle them
10
The theory upon which the majority proceeds is
to maintain their action.
3. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (Ch. 1907).
4. Moore v. Rugg, 44 Minn. 28, 46 N.W. 141, 20 Am. St. Rep. 539 (1890).
5. This theory was first advanced in the well-known article by Brandeis and Warren,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR . L. REv. 193 (1890). But cf. Zimmermann v. *Wilson,
81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), 84 U. PA. L. REv. 789; Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary
Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932).
6. A notable exception is the group of cases arising under the N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS
LAw § 51, which specifically requires that defendant have invaded plaintiff's privacy
"for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade." Nev York also denies any common
law right of privacy: Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box.Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E.
442, 59 L.R.A. 478, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1902).
7. Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) ; Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc.
290, 26 N.Y. Supp. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; cf. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga.
257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849, 42 L.R.A.
(x.s.) 386 (1912) ; Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905), aff'd, 117
La. 703, 42 So. 227, 7 L.R.A. (N.s.) 274 (1906) ; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479,
39 So. 499, 1 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1147 (1905); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543
(1940).
8. Brandeis and Warren, supra note 5, at 197. Prosser speaks of the right of privacy
as being "only a phase" of the new tort of intentional causing of mental disturbances.
PRossER, ToRTs 1053 (1941).

9. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1927) ; cf. Brandeis
and Warren, supra note 5, at 218.
10. Two judges agreed that there was not sufficient damage 231 P.2d at 571. The
dissenting judge argued that the degree of damage done plaintiffs should be a jury
question. Id. at 572.
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in accord with the weight of authority in that it limits recovery to those unreasonable interferences with privacy which are offensive to "ordinary sensibilities."'1 As stated in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corporation,12 the publication
should transcend the "community's notions of decency" in order to be actionable. In that case, consideration was given to the well-known doctrine that
privileged invasions may occur where the public is said to have a legitimate
interest in the affairs of the individual, as where the individual is a celebrity
or notorious figure. 13 The relationship between this privilege and the "ordinary sensibilities" test is obvious: the privilege ends where the individual's
interest in privacy becomes superior to the public's interest in publication.
But it is quite possible to apply the "ordinary sensibilities" test in an action
for publishing a part of plaintiff's life history where there was no valid
interest in the publication on the part of the public which could conflict with
14
the plaintiff's interest in keeping his history private.
Granting the validity of the "ordinary sensibilities" test there remains
the question of whether the court itself can apply the test or whether, as the
dissenting opinion argues, 15 the jury should be given that task. What authority there is seems to indicate that it is a matter of law,'" and that juries should
not be allowed to pass on a plaintiff's every contention that he has been
injured. Perhaps the problem is analogous to the one in the law of defamation
vwith regard to whether words are "reasonably susceptible" of a defamatory
interpretation. The court in that situation is to determine whether the words
11. Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corporation, 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d
225 (1950) ; Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) ; Schuyler v.
Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 49 Am. St. Rep. 671 (1895) ; see Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133, 139 (1945) ; Kelley v. Post Pub. Co., 98 N.E.2d
286 (Mass. 1951); PRossER, ToRTs 54 (1941) (speaking generally of recovery for
mental distress); WINFIELD, TExT-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT 621 (3d ed. 1946);
Feinberg, supra note 2 at 718-22; Pound, Interests in Personality, 28 HARY. L. REv.

343, 363, (1915); 41 Am. JuR., Privacy 934-35 (1942).
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suggests that "liability exists only if the defendant's conduct was such that he should
have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities." (Emphasis
added.) RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 comment d (1939). Analogous to this is the
provision that "A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal
dignity." Id. § 19.
12. 113 F.2d 806, 138 A.L.R. 15 (2d Cir. 1940).
13. Id. at 809. Brandeis and Warren, supra note 5, at 214-16, recognized this privilege and much has been made of it, so that it forms a rather large branch of the law
of privacy-too large for consideration here. See Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35
Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
14. Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corporation, 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225
(1950) (Defendant falsely publicized by means of telegraph that plaintiff owed him
money and that he intended to sue plaintiff, his purpose, assuming it not malicious,
being only to force payment from plaintiff.) Cf. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299
S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1927).
15. 231 P.2d at 572.
16. Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corporation, 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225
(1950); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Hinish v. Meier
& Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438, 138 A.L.R. 1 (1941); see Reed v. Real
Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133, 139 (1945). Contra: Pallas v. Crowley,
Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); cf. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla.
198, 20 So.2d 243, 246, 168 A.L.R. 430 (1944).
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are "reasonably susceptible" of a particular interpretation, and the jury is to
say whether they actually were so understood.' 7 This court, therefore, could
be said to hold that the publication of the picture could not be offensive to
"ordinary sensibilities" and thus to have precluded.the jury from deciding
whether and to what extent the plaintiffs were injured in their feelings. On
the other hand, if the court had held that the picture could be offensive to
"ordinary sensibilities," the jury would then determine either that plaintiffs
were damaged to a certain extent or that plaintiffs were in fact not hurt and
should receive only nominal damages.18
In addition to its holding that, as a matter of law, the picture of the
plaintiffs is not offensive to "ordinary sensibilities," the majority also indicates that a plaintiff could not be said to have suffered any detriment from
the publication when "it does not show him in an uncomplimentary pose or
tend to humiliate him or in any sense present him to his discredit or disadvantage."'19 This language sounds very much like the law of defamation
and as such is definitely expressing a minority view. It was exactly such
limitations upon recovery to injuries to the reputation only, as distinguished
20
from injuries to the feelings, which led to the development of this new tort.
TRUSTS-DUALITY OF INTEREST-MERGER OF TITLE IN
BENEFICIARY
A, B, C and D, owners of certain land in fee, transferred it to themselves,
as trustees, in trust for themselves. By authority of the trust agreement,
plaintiffs, as trustees, leased the land to defendant and now, as beneficiaries,
bring this action to set aside the conveyance on the ground that no trust
existed. The lower court denied relief. Held, affirmed. The rule that a trust
17. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 254 (4th ed. 1924) ; ODGEns,
94 (6th ed. 1929), PROSSER, TORTS, 789 (1941).

LIBEL AND SLANDER

18. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (nominal
damages awarded in absence of proof of actual damages); Hinish v. Meier & Frank
Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438, 448, 138 A.L.R. 1 (1941) (". . . plaintiff is entitled
to recover nominal damages at least, and any additional damages for injury to his
feelings that he may be able to prove, besides punitive damages if there was actual
malice.").
19. 231 P.2d at 570.
20. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Brandeis
and Warren, supra, note 5 at 193-7. But see Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424,
120 S.W. 364, 366, 34 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1137 (1909). In two other California cases there
is language similar to that employed by the court in the instant case. Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91, 93 (1931) (California Constitution, Art. I, § 1 guarantees the right of "'pursuing and obtaining ... happiness,'" which "by its very nature
includes the right to live free from the unwarranted attack of others upon one's own
liberty, property, and reputation.") (Emphasis added.) Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942) ("Does the law refuse all redress to
one who has been thus grievously imposed upon and subjected to embarrassment,
humiliation and scorn. . .?" Also dicta that elements of libel were present in the
case and that recovery could have been granted on that ground alone, but for certain
technical deficiencies in pleading).
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cannot exist where the legal and beneficial interests are in the same person
does not apply where the several beneficiaries of a trust, whose interests
therein are not common to each other, are also the trustees. Fry v. McCormick, 228 P.2d 727 (Kan. 1951).
Generally it is regarded as a fundamental essential to the existence of
any trust that legal ownership be separated from beneficial enjoyment., The
doctrine of merger has been advanced for the proposition that a trust should
fail of creation if there is a union of interests in the same person. 2 This
doctrine is based upon two general considerations: (1) the impossibility of
securing an impartial administration of the trust; and (2) the necessity for
two separate persons in order that an obligation, legal or equitable, may
exist. The situation where these basic considerations may be most logically
advanced in favor of the merger doctrine is where the sole trustee is also
the sole beneficiary. 3 There the authorities agree that he holds the property
free of trust.4 A trust necessarily implies an equitable obligation as to the
use of property; hence the trustee (obligor) must be a different person from
the cestui (obligee). An individual, of course, cannot maintain a bill in equity
against himself to compel his carrying out the terms of a trust. However, in
various fact situations and without reference to the above basic considerations, many courts have declared that both the legal and the beneficial interests cannot exist and be maintained separately in the same person.6
When the attempted trust relationship involves more than one person
and each person is both a trustee and a beneficiary, the argument that this
duality of interest prevents the successful creation of a trust is weak,0 for
1. Morsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F.2d 18, 113 A.L.R. 441 (8th
Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 701 (1937) ; Julian v. Northwestern Trust Co., 192
Minn. 136, 255 N.W. 622 (1934); Blades v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 224 N.C. 32, 29
S.E.2d 148, 151 A.L.R. 1278 (1944) ; see 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 347 (7th ed.

1929).

2. Odom v. Morgan, 177 N.C. 367, 99 S.E. 195 (1919); 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§ 99, comment a (1935) ; 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 129 (2d ed. 1951).

3. Compare Butler v. Godley, 12 N.C. 94 (1826), with Blades v. Norfolk Southern
Ry., 224 N.C. 32, 29 S.E.2d 148, 151 A.L.R. 1278 (1944). See 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES

§ 129 (2d ed. 1951); 1 ScoTT,

TRUSTS

§§ 99-100 (1939); Note, 151 A.LR.

1287 (1944).
4. Morsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F.2d 18, 113 A.L.R. 441
(8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 701 (1937); Des Moines Terminal Co. v. Des
Moines Union Ry., 52 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 537 (1932);
Butler v. Godley, 12 N.C. 94 (1826) ; 1 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 99(5) (1935).
5. See Greene v. Greene, 125 N.Y. 506, 26 N.E. 739 (1891) (the several beneficiaries
were also the trustees, cf. note 15 infra) ; In re Hitchins, 39 Misc. 767, 80 N.Y. Supp.
1125, 1128 (Surr. Ct. 1903) (the sole trustee was the sole beneficiary) ; In re Marshall's
Will, 36 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Surr. Ct. 1942) (the several beneficiaries were also the
trustees, but the decision was never appealed). But cf. Reed v. Browne, 295 N. Y.
184, 66 N.E.2d 47, 165 A.L.R. 1061 (1946); Bacorn v. People, 195 Misc. 917, 88
N.Y.S.2d 628 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (tacitly distinguishing the prior cases on the point suggested by the text writers). See Note, 151 A.L.R. 1287 (1944).
6. Flagg v. Walker, 113 U.S. 659, 5 Sup. Ct. 697, 28 L. Ed. 1072 (1885); Nellis
v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 66 Pac. 32 (1901) ; Sherlock v. Thompson, 167 Iowa 1, 148
N.W. 1035 (1914). See 1

BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §

129 (2d ed. 1951).
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each trustee-beneficiary owes to the others equitable obligations as to the use
of the trust corpus. So long as either the legal or equitable interest is in more
than one person, the obligor-obligee relationship can exist. No court has
held that such a duality of interest is so serious as to make the intended trust
void merely because of the difficulty of unbiased administration, although the
court may think it proper to appoint new trustees.7
Some courts, nevertheless, have extended the doctrine of merger to the
situation where the group of beneficiaries are also the trustees, and they
have held that in such a situation there is no trust.8 It would seem, however,
as in the principal case, that there is no good reason for thus defeating the
intention of the settlor.9 These trustee-beneficiaries hold the equitable interest as tenants in common and the legal interest as joint tenants. 10 In England, where the rule is clearly contrary to that of the principal case,'1 the
intention of the testator is not so important in controlling the disposition of his
estate.' 2 Several jurisdictions in this country have announced a general
doctrine of merger in such a way as to appear to favor the English rule
on merger of the trust interest,' 3 yet Alabama is apparently the only jurisdiction which would reach a result opposite to that of the principal case.' 4 The
other courts that originally followed the English rule have decided later
cases tacitly overruling their previous decisions, or the rule as originally laid
down can 15e disregarded as dictum.15
7. See, e.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 27 Fed. 146
(C.C.D. Ind. 1886); Walker v. Walker, 25 Ga. 420 (1858); Olson v. Larson, 320 Ill.

50, 150 N.E. 337 (1925); Mettler v. Warner, 243 Ill. 600, 90 N.E. 1099, 134 Am. St.
Rep. 388 (1910). See also 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 33 (1939).
8. See, e.g., Dunn v. Ponceler, 230 Ala. 375, 161 So. 450 (1935) ; accord, Greene v.
Greene, 125 N.Y. 506, 26 N.E. 739 (1891). See also Note, 29 YALE L.J. 97 (1919).
9. "Equity controls the application of the doctrine of merger to the given case and
equity will prevent a merger in order to effectuate the manifest intent of the testator
where the interest and purposes of justice are thereby promoted. Merger is disfavored.
The trust is the special child of equity. In the circumstances of this case, the clear and
carefully premeditated intent of the testator is the persuasive equitable consideration.
No harm visits the defendants in now recognizing the desired trust." Morgan v. Murton,
131 N.J. Eq. 481, 26 A.2d 45, 53 (Ch. 1942), 27 MINx. L. REv. 100.
10. Noyes v. Noyes, 110 Vt. 511, 9 A.2d 123 (1939). But cf. it re Selous, [1901]
1 Ch. 921, 922 (court said difference in interest between these two estates is so small
and shadowy that there is no presumption against merger).
11. In re Selous, [1901] 1 Ch. 921.
12. The beneficiaries, in England, can sometimes terminate the trust despite the
explicit words of the trust instrument and despite the fact that material purposes of the
trust have not been fulfilled. These views may account for the English theory, but the
attitude of the United States courts is contra in both respects. See 3 ScOTT, TRUSTS
§§ 337, 340 (1939).
13. Dunn v. Ponceler, 230 Ala. 375, 161 So. 450 (1935) ; Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Me.
55, 56 Atl. 215 (1903) ; Neville v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124, 136 N.E. 160 (1922) ; Enochs
& Flowers v. Roell, 170 Miss. 44, 154 So. 299 (1934); Cooper v. Cooper, 5 N.J. Eq.
9 (Ch. 1845); Greene v. Greene, 125 N.Y. 506, 26 N.E. 739 (1891).
14. See Sisson v. Swift, 243 Ala. 289, 9 So.2d 891, 898 (1942) (expressing an
attitude contra to the view prevailing in the Dunn case, supra, note 13).
15. New York.-The text writers have distinguished Greene v. Greene, 124 N.Y.
506, 26 N.E. 739 (1891), by reference to legislation upon the subject which permits
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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-ATTORNEY-ACCOUNTANT
CONTROVERSY-PREPARATION BY "TAX EXPERT" OF INCOME
TAX RETURN INVOLVING LEGAL QUESTIONS
Defendant, a former deputy collector for the Internal Revenue Department but not a member of the bar, advertised himself as an "income tax
expert" and carried on a business of preparing tax returns for a fee. Au
investigator from a county bar association came to defendant with a
fictitious set of facts and asked him to prepare his tax return. Defendant
accepted a fee for his services in preparing the return for his supposed client,
in the process of which he resolved questions as to his client's martial and
partnership status and deductible business losses. Plaintiff bar association
brought an action to enjoin defendant from the unauthorized practice of
law and to have him adjudged in contempt of court. A perpetual injunction
was granted by the lower court. Held, affirmed. The resolving of difficult
questions of law, even if incidental to defendant's lawful business, is the
practice of law and should be enjoined to protect the public interest. Gardner
v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1951).
Since the practice of law often involves substantial and permanent
changes in the legal rights of persons, it is restricted by law to licensed attorneys as a matter of public protection. Licensing requires not only tests of
legal competence and ability but professional responsibility as well; and
persons not so authorized are prohibited by statute from practicing law.1
But in deciding whether specific acts by a layman constitute the unauthorized
practice of law, the courts have indicated that an exact definition of the
phrase "practice of law" is impossible, it being necessary to decide each
case on its own particular facts.2 It is clear, however, that the practice of
trusts only for the purposes stated in the statute. Bacorn v. People, 195 Misc. 917, 88
N.Y.S.2d 628 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (accepted the distinction by stating that the trust involved was within the purposes stated by statute and upheld the trust in a situation
analogous to that of the Greene case). New Jersey.-The earlier cases have been in
effect overruled. Mesce v. Gradone, 1 N.J. 159, 62 A.2d 394 (1948). Main.-The same
result would have been reached in Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Me. 55, 56 Atl. 215 (1903),
whether the trustees had a double interest or not, according to the opinion of the case.
Missachuetts.-The court based the decision in Neville v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124, 136
N.E. 160 (1922), on the ground that by the terms of the trust a partnership rather than
a trust was created. Mississippi-In Enochs & Flowers v. Roell, 170 Miss. 44, 154 So.
299 (1934), the English rule, as announced was dictum, the court basing its decision
upon the ground that the beneficiaries had complete control of a business trust.
1. For a collection of the statutes of each state prohibiting the practice of law
by laymen see Otterbourg, A Study of Unauthorized Practice of Law, UNAUTHORIZED
PRACricE NEWs (sp. issue, Sept. 1951). Even in the absence of statute the courts may
enjoin its practice in a criminal contempt action. See Sanders, Procedure for the
Punishment or Suppression of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 5 LAW & CONTEM1p. Puton.
135 (1938).
2. See It re Shoe Manufacturers Protective Ass'n, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d
746 (1936). For a general discussion of what constitutes the practice of law, see Notes,
151 A.L.R. 781 (1914), 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940), 111 A.L.R. 19 (1937).
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law is not confined to appearances in court proceedings 3 but includes "...
legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured." 4 In the absence of an exact
definition, the courts have had difficulty in drawing a line between permissible business activities which might involve legal questions on the one
hand, and the unauthorized practice of law on the other. 5 This is especially
0
true in the tax field where there is an overlapping of law and accounting.
By the traditional test, presenting elementary- legal advice is not the
practice of law when such services are reasonably incidental to the conduct
of a person's authorized business.7 For example, it has been held that a
trust company may give its customers pamphlets describing tax liability
and the method of making a tax return s and may even advise on the necessity of making a return. 9 But any legal advice given for a consideration and
not in connection with a layman's regular business is considered as unauthorized practice. 10 For instance, solicitation to collect tax refunds" or
12
advice on collecting refunds by a layman is prohibited.
3. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934) ; People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y.
334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
4. Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836, 837 (1893).
5. For general information on unauthorized practice and the efforts to suppress
it see Symposium: The "Unauthorized Practice of Law" Controversy, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 1-170 (1938); Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and
Lay Agencies, 41 YALE L.J. 69 (1931). For a collection of cases on unauthorized
practice see Brand, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECISIONS (1937). For current information
on unauthorized practice consult the Unauthorized Practice News, published quarterly
by the American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice. For the
techniques and procedures available in suppressing unauthorized practice, see Sanders,
Procedure for the Punishment or Suppression of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB.

135 (1938).

6. Maxwell and Charles, Joint Statement as to Tax Accountancy and Law Practice,
32 A.B.A.J. 5, 6 (1946). The unauthorized practice problem exists in other fields as
well, such as insurance adjusting, real estate business, collection agencies and publishing
of law books. For a statement of the problem in these fields, see Otterbourg, A Study
of Unauthorized Practice of Law, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEvs (sp. issue, Sept,
1951) ; Note 151 A.L.R. 781, 783 (1944).
7. Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940) ; Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d
27 (1943), 42 MICH. L. REv. 1122 (1944).
8. Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., 220 Ind. 202, 41 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
9. See Girard Investment Co. v. Collector of Int. Rev., 122 F.2d 843, 848 (3d Cir.
1941) (by implication), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 699 (1942).
10. In re Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730, 9 A.L.R. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1947),
rev'd, 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87
N.E.2d 451 (1949), 33 MINN. L. REv. 445 (1949), 23 TULANE L. Rzv. 294 (1948), 56
YALE L.J. 1438 (1947). In this widely discussed case an accountant was held to be
engaged in the unlawful practice of law when, as an independent matter not in connection with preparing a tax return or in auditing books, he advised a corporation on the
legality of taking certain income tax deductions, the court basing its decisions on the
ground that the advice given was not incidental to his regular accounting business.
This "incidental" test has been criticized in that it permits the giving of any legal advice, regardless of its difficulty or consequences, as long as it is rendered incidentally
to the accountant's business. See Merrick v. American Security and Trust Co., 107
F.2d 271, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (criticized in dissenting opinion); Austin, Relations
Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants, 36 IOWA L. REv. 227, 235 (1951).
11. Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942).
12. Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N.Y. Supp.
462 (N.Y. City Ct. 1936).
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In dealing with the preparation by nonlawyers of income tax returns,
the courts in the past have held that passing on a question of law incidental
to preparing the returns is not the practice of law.13 Some decisions on this
point are restricted to returns of the "least difficult" kind and indicate that
14
a different result might be reached if the return were more complicated.
Other courts take the position that regardless of the risks involved to the
taxpayer any legal, questions may be properly disposed of by a layman
if incidental to preparing a tax return. 15 In the instant case the court has
rejected the "incidental test" as the sole criterion and has taken the view
that an accountant should not resolve difficult questions of law, even if such
service is incidental to filling out a tax return.
Any distinction between law practice and accounting should be determined by a consideration of the nature of the services rendered in each
case. There can be little doubt that only a lawyer would be qualified to
handle the matter where possible charges of fraud or questions of nontax
law are involved' 6 or where the preparation of the return would require
the construction of a deed of trust or a will. 17 On the other hand, only a

trained accountant could determine income for a client where matters such
as inventory pricing methods or accrual and installment accounting are concerned. It is also true that there is a great area in tax practice within the
professional competence of both lawyer and accountant,' 8 but the fact that
there is common ground between them does not eradicate the line. Tax law
is more than accounting, however, for it requires a knowledge of rules of
statutory construction of stare decisis, of evidence and of general substantive
law in interpreting the statutes and decisions on tax law. 19 Therefore, one
trained only in accounting regardless of his knowledge of tax law, would
not have the orientation necessary to qualify as a tax lawyer. In the instant
case the court has taken the position that if there is a danger in allowing
persons not qualified as lawyers to give legal advice as a primary business
then the same danger exists if the legal advice is incidental to preparing a
tax return and therefore should be prohibited as a protection of the public.
13. Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939) ; see
Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
14. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943) ; see Blair v.
Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 429 (1939).
15. In re Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1947), discussed supra
note 10. This is based on the convenience of the public in not having to stand the added
expense of having to also consult an attorney.
16. Austin, Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants in Income
Tax Practice, 36 IowA L. REV. 227, 228 (1951).
17. It re Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; see note 10, supra.
18. For instance both lawyers and Certified Public Accountants are allowed to practice before the Treasury Department and the Tax Court. D.C. 230 (rev.) § 10.3,
1947-2 Cu.

BULL. 288, 293.

19. Bowe, Cash and Accrual Methods of Income Tax Accounting, 2 VAND. L.
REV. 60 (1949).
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That the unwary taxpayer can be damaged by those giving legal
advice who are not qualified as lawyers is a fact which is, unfortunately,
seldom realized by the public.2 0 Lawyers and certified public accountants have

through their national organizations agreed that when issues are presented
in a tax return which only a member of the other*profession is competent to
handle, then they should be consulted. 21 However, since the majority of so
called "tax experts" are not certified public accountants, 22 both groups owe a
duty to the public to see that persons practicing in the tax field do not advise
a client as to matters beyond their competency. The "difficult question of
law" test in this case in an extension of the present trend toward restricting
the activities of laymen in the tax field, and its application by other courts will
considerably extend the range of the concept of what constitutes unauthorized
practice.
WILLS-ADEMPTION-BEQUEST OF PROCEEDS OF SPECIFIC
PROPERTY
In her will testatrix directed that a certain piece of real property be
sold and the proceeds distributed among eight legatees. She subsequently
sold the property in question, invested the proceeds in securities, sold these
and purchased other securities. She also used part of the proceeds for her
own purposes. Held, the gifts of the proceeds were specific legacies and were
adeemed by the subsequent sale of the property and receipt of the proceeds
by the testatrix. In re McCray's Estate, 96 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1951).
If a testator in his will has given a particular thing and this property
is not contained in his estate at his death, the gift is said to be adeemed and
the legatee takes nothing.' The rule of ademption applies only in cases of
specific legacies or devises. 2 While the intention of the testator is controlling
20. One example of where a taxpayer relied on the wrong person's advice is the
case where he was advised by an accountant, as to whether he should file a Personal
Holding Company Tax return, and was fined for his failure to do so, the court pointing
out that reliance on his accountant's advice did not excuse him on the grounds of
reasonable delay. Hermax Co., 11 T.C. 442 (1948).
21. Noteworthy progress has been made in settling the dispute between these
groups by the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants. This
group was formed in 1944 for the purpose of considering their 'mutual problems and
attempting to take the dispute out of the field of public combat. One. significant result
of this conference is the agreement that neither lawyers nor certified public accountants
will designate themselves as "tax experts" or "tax consultants." The text of a statement of principles defining the proper areas of federal tax practice for members of both
professions is set out in 91 J. AcCOUNTANcY 869 (1951) ; UNAUTHORIZED PRACTIcE NEws
82 (sp. issue, Sept. 1951).
22. Note, 2 ARK. L. REV. 432, 438 (1949).

1. ATKINSON,

WILLS

690 (1937) ; Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical

Effects, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 11, 19. For present purposes the definition of ademption
includes only what is more specifically referred to as "ademption by extinction."
2. ATKINSON, WILLS 690 (1937) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1515 (3d ed. 1941).
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in determination of the type of legacy or devise, 3 by the great weight of
authority such intention is immaterial to the question of whether or not a
gift of specific property is adeemed. 4 Almost all courts inquire only as to
the existence of the specific property as a part of the testator's estate.
However, when the bequest is of the proceeds of specific property and
the testator receives the proceeds during his lifetime, the question becomes
more difficult, and the courts are not in agreement. Many courts have
recognized a distinction between such bequests and gifts of specific property,"
and some have given weight to the testator's intention in deciding the question of ademption of such proceeds. Considerations of factual differences in
the individual cases, as well as conflicting rules and policies of the courts, have
contributed to the split of authority.7
Perhaps a majority of the courts have taken the position that receipt
of such proceeds by the testator and subsequent dealings therewith by him
do not work an ademption of the gift, where the proceeds can be traced
and identified. 8 Some of these courts stress the distinction between a gift of
3. ATxisoN, WILLS 703 (1937); 4

PAGE, WILLS

§ 1392 (3d ed. 1941). To avoid

ademption by extinction, courts incline to consider legacies as demonstrative rather
than specific. See, e.g., Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549, 119 So. 678, 680 (1929) ; Maxim
v. Maxim, 129 Me. 349, 152 Atl. 268, 270, 73 A.L.R. 12 (1930) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1399
(3d ed. 1941).
4. E.g., Elwyn v. DeGarmendia, 148 Md. 109, 128 Atl. 913 (1925) ; In re Rubenstein's
Estate, 169 Misc. 273, 7 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Humphreys v. Humphreys,
2 Cox Ch. 184, 30 Eng. Rep. 85 (Ch. 1789); ATKINSoN, WILLS 691 (1937). For an

excellent treatment of the historical background and development of the doctrine of
ademption, see Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 1943 Wis. L.
REv. 11.

5. American Bible Soc. v. Holman, 1 Fed. Cas. 621, No. 291 (D. Minn. 1878);
Miller's Ex'r v. Melone, 109 Ky. 133, 58 S.W. 708, 95 Am. St. Rep. 338 (1900) ; Merrill
v. Winchester, 120 Me. 203, 113 Atl. 261 (1921) ; In re Manshaem's Estate, 207 Mich.
1, 173 N.W. 483 (1919); Prendergast v. Walsh, 58 N.J. Eq. 149, 42 Atl. 1049 (Ch.
1899); In re Roth's Will, 183 Misc. 834, 51 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Surr. Ct. 1944), mnodified,
271 App. Div. 972, 67 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2nd Dep't 1947), aff'd as modified, 297 N.Y.
757, 77 N.E. 520 (1948) ; Nooe v. Vannoy, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 185 (1861) ; In re
Frost's Estate, 354 Pa. 223, 47 A.2d 219, 165 A.L.R. 1030 (1946) ; In re Black's Estate,
223 Pa. 382, 72 Atl. 631 (1909) ; Gist v. Craig, 142 S.C. 407, 141 S.E. 26 (1927) ; In re
Barrow's Estate, 103 Vt. 501, 156 Atl. 408 (1931). See Note, 165 A.L.R. 1032 (1946).
6. See e.g., American Bible Soc. v. Holman, 1 Fed. Cas. 621, No. 291 (D. Minn,
1878) ; It re Dwyer's Estate, 159 Cal. 664, 115 Pac. 235, 239 (1911) (holding legacy
adeemed) ; Reed v. Reed, 68 Ga. 589, 590 (1882); Meilly v. Knox, 269 I1. 463, 110
N.E. 56, 58 (1915)' (holding legacy adeemed). Contra: In re Farber's Will, 53
N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; it re Barrow's Estate, 103 Vt. 501, 156 Atl. 408,
413 (1931).
7. See Note, 165 A.L.R. 1032, 1033 (1946), containing an exhaustive review of the
cases on the question of ademption of bequests of proceeds of property.
8. E.g., American Bible Society v. Holman, 1 Fed. Cas. 621, No. 291 (D. Minn.
1878); Connecticut Trust Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 55 Atl. 171 (1903); Reed v.
Reed, 68 Ga. 589 (1882); Merrill v. Winchester, 120 Me. 203, 113 Atl. 261 (1921);
In re Manshaem's Estate, 207 Mich. 1, 173 N.W. 483 (1919); Nooe v. Vannoy, 59
N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 185 (1861); In re Frost's Estate, 354 Pa. 223, 47 A.2d 219, 165
A.L.R. 1030 (1946); Gist v. Craig, 142 S.C. 407, 141 S.E. 26 (1927); In re Barrow's
Estate, 103 Vt. 501, 156 Atl. 408 (1931) ; In re Kamba's Estate, 230 Wis. 246, 282 N.W.
570, 119 A.L.R. 1383 (1938); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1528 (3d ed. 1941). Also, some cases
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specific property and a gift of the proceeds of such property;9 other courts
point out that the disposition of the property and collection of the proceeds
by the testator merely facilitate the payment of the legacy.' 0 On the other
hand, a substantial number of courts have held that a bequest of the proceeds of specific property is adeemed by the receipt of the proceeds by the
testator and his subsequent dealings therewith." Some of these courts have
recognized no difference in a bequest of the proceeds of specific property and
a bequest or devise of the specific property itself, and have held that the
disposition of the property worked an ademption of the bequest. 12 While
some cases have merely stated the rule that the testator's intention is immaterial," others have found in such disposition an intent to adeem. 14 Also,
where the will directed the sale of the property after the death of the
testator, and gave the proceeds, it has been reasoned that if the property was
no longer a part of the estate there was nothing on which the clause could
operate.'6 Other reasons suggested were the difficulty of tracing the proceeds
in complex property holdings,' 6 the delay in settling estates and the encour17
agement of vexatious litigation.
The court in the instant case refused to find any difference between a
bequest of proceeds of specific property and a bequest of the property itself,
which have held legacies adeemed have reached the decision on the ground that the
proceeds cannot be traced and distinguished from the rest of the estate. Cf. Durham's
Adm'r v. Clay, 142 Ky. 96, 134 S.W. 153 (1911); In re Bouk's Estate, 80 Misc. 196,
141 N.Y.S. 922 (Surr. Ct. 1913); King v. Sellers, 194 N.C. 533, 140 S.E. 91 (1927).
9. See note 5, supra.
10. Connecticut Trust Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 55 Atl. 171 (1903); Miller's
Ex'r v. Melone, 109 Ky. 133, 58 S.W. 708, 95 Am. St. Rep. 338 (1900); Merrill v.
Winchester, 120 Me. 203, 113 Atl. 261 (1921). See In re Dwyer's Estate, 159 Cal. 664,
115 Pac. 235, 239 (1911); In re Sorenson's Estate, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35, 115 P.2d 241,
242 (1941).
11. E.g., Plant v. Donaldson, 39 App. D.C. 162 (1912); Meilly v. Knox, 191 Ill.
App. 126 (1915), aff'd, 269 Ill. 463, 110 N.E. 56 (1915) ; In re Miller's Will, 128 Iowa
612, 105 N.W. 105 (1905) ; Moffatt v. Heon, 242 Mass. 201, 136 N.E. 123 (1922) ; In re
Farber's Will, 53 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va.
617, 79 S.E. 1026 (1913) ; Arnald v. Arnald, 1 Bro. C.C. 401, 28 Eng. Rep. 1203 (Ch.
1784) ; accord, Ford v. Cottrell, 141 Tenn. 169, 207 S.W. 734 (1918).
12. E.g., Plant v. Donaldson, 39 App. D.C. 162 (1912); May v. Sherrard's
Legatees, 115 Va. 617, 79 S.E. 1026 (1913); accord, Ford v. Cottrell, 141 Tenn. 169,
207 S.W. 734 (1918). But the view taken as to whether intention should be given
weight does not appear to have affected the view followed as to whether bequests of
proceeds are adeemed by disposition of the property by the testator or someone in
his behalf. See Note, 165 A.L.R. 1032, 1033 (1946).
13. In re Farber's Will, 53 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; May v. Sherrard's
Legatees, 115 Va. 617, 79 S.E. 1026 (1913).
14. Besides the instant case, see Plant v. Donaldson, 39 App. D.C. 162 (1912);
Meilly v. Knox, 191 Ill. App. 126 (1915), aff'd, 269 Ill. 463, 110 N.E. 56, 58 (1915)
(lack of intent to make gift in any case found) ; In re Kulp's Estate, 122 Neb. 157, 239
N.W. 636, 638 (1931).
15. See It re Miller's Will, 128 Iowa 612, 105 N.W. 105, 107 (1905) (proceeds
of general property); In re Kulp's Estate, 122 Neb. 157, 239 N.W. 636, 638 (1931);
Ford v. Cottrell, 141 Tenn. 169, 207 S.W. 734, 737 (1918). Compare Ford v. Cottrell,
supra, with Clark v. Packard, 9 Gray 417 (Mass. 1857).
16. In re Kulp's Estate, 122 Neb. 157, 239 N.W. 636 (1931).
17. I re Miller's Will, 128 Iowa 612, 105 N.W. 105, 107 (1905).
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and applied the doctrine of ademption accordingly. As a result, the portion
of the estate which would have been the subject of the bequest passed by
intestacy.
The paramount aim in the construction of a will is to determine and
give effect to the testator's intention.18 It has been recognized that the doctrine
of ademption operates to defeat this intention, 9 as well as to overcome the
well-established presumption against intestacy. 20 The rationale of this harsh
rule is that attempting to ascertain the testator's intention leads to "endless
uncertainty and confusion."'21 The courts should be reluctant to extend the
doctrine, and in cases of bequests of proceeds of specific property it is of
doubtful application. The distinction between a gift of the proceeds and a
gift of specific property itself appears a valid one, and the better view would
appear to be that which sustains the legacy where the fund can be traced
and identified. Such a result seems more likely to effectuate the testator's
intention.
WILLS-IMPLIED REVOCATION-EFFECT OF ADOPTION OF CHILD
SUBSEQUENT TO EXECUTION
Testatrix adopted a minor child subsequent to the execution of a will
in which she had made no mention of or provision for a child. Testatrix'
husband, as next friend of the adopted child, opposed probation of the will
on the ground that it had been revoked by the adoption of the child subsequent to its execution. The lower court admitted the will to probate and
the husband appealed. Held, reversed. The legal adoption by testatrix of a
minor child revoked the antecedent will by implication or inference of law.
Thornton v. Anderson, 64 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1951).
Statutes delimiting the power to devise property by will are generally
broad enough to allow the testator to exercise this power in favor of whomever he wishes.' But a testator's actual intent may be defeated by the doctrine
of "implied revocation."'2 It was a general rule of the common law that
18. ATKINSON, WILLS 755 (1937); 2 PAGE, WILLS §§ 913 ct seq. (3d ed. 1941).
19. See, e.g., Jessel, M.R., in Harrison v. Jackson, 7 Ch. D. 339, 341 (1877): "If
I were allowed to guess what was the intention of the testator in this case and in others
where specific bequests have been held to be adeemed, I should say that the doctrine
of ademption very often defeats that intention." Accord, Trustees Unitarian Society v.
Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, 23 N.E. 1006 (1890) (Holmes, J.) ; Nooe v. Vannoy, 59 N.C. (6 Jones
Eq.) 185 (1861); Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its PracticalEffects, 1943 Wis. L.
Rzv. 11, 26. For a critical treatment of specific legacies and problems arising therefrom,
see Mechem, Specifie Legacies of Unspecific Things-Ashburner v. McGuire Reconsidered, 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 546 (1939).
20. See, e.g., the opinion in the instant case, 96 F. Supp. at 257.
21. "[T~he idea of discussing what were the particular motives and intention of
the testator in each case, in destroying the subject of the bequest, would be productive
" Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox Ch. 84,
of endless uncertainty and confusion ...
30 Eng. Rep. 85 (Ch. 1789).
1. 1 PAGE, WILLIS § 196 (3d ed. 1941).

2.

ATKINSON, WILLS

396 (1937).

19511

RECENT CASES

neither marriage of the testator 3 nor birth of a child4 subsequent to execution
of a will would alone effect a revocation of the will. However, if both marriage and birth of a child occurred subsequent to the execution of a will, it
was revoked, provided the testator had made no provision for the wife and
child.6 This rule is founded on a presumption of an alteration of the testator's
mind arising from circumstances occurring since the making of the will and
6
producing a change in his previous obligations and duties.
These common law rules have generally become obsolete by the enactment of legislation designed to protect after-born children." The statute in
the instant case,8 providing for the revocation of a will by the subsequent
birth of a child, exists in some form in practically all states. 9 The adoption
statutes'0 present a more difficult problem in whether the adoption of a
3. Herzog v. Trust Co. of Easton, 67 Fla. 54, 64 So. 426, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 201
(1914); Roane v. Hollingshead, 76 Md. 369, 25 Atl. 307, 17 L.R.A. 592, 35 Am. St.
Rep. 438 (1892); ATKINSON, WILLS 398 (1937); BIGELOW, WILLS 114 (1898); 1
ScHOULER, LAW or WILLS, EXECUTORS, AND AD, INISTRATORS § 640 (6th ed. 1923).
Marriage of a woman at common law did revoke her will since on acquiring her common law disability, she could not revoke the will and it lost its ambulatory character.
RooD, WILLS § 372 (2d ed. 1926).
4. In re Allen's Estate, 64 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1946); Easterlin v. Easterlin,
62 Fla. 468, 56 So. 688 (1911) ; ATKINSON, WILLS 401 (1937) ; RooD, WILLS 381 (2d
cd. 1926) ; 1 ScHoTLER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 642.
5. See, e.g., Shorten v. Judd, 60 Kan. 73, 55 Pac. 286 (1898) ; Baldwin v. Spriggs,
65 Md. 373, 5 Atl. 295 (1886); ATKINSON, WILLS 403 (1937); BIGELOW, WILLS 114
(1898) ; ROOD, WILLS § 375 (2d ed. 1926) ; 1 ScHOULER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 642.
6. ATKINSON, WILLS 403 (1937); 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES 521 (1896); ROOD,
WILLS 377 (2d ed. 1926).
7. Statutes of various forms providing for after-born children exist in every state
except Florida, Maryland and Wyoming. ATKINSON, WILLS 402 n.22 (1937). See
generally, Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills, 14 IOWA L. REV. 283, 290-300 (1929). An
after-born child may be excluded if there is an intent to disinherit. King v. King,
166 Tenn. 115, 59 S.W.2d 510 (1933) (will made 8 months before birth of child and
testator lived' 8 years after making will; intent to disinherit is apparent).
8. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-408 (1937). "In all cases, the marriage of the testator
or the birth of a child to him, subsequently to the making of a will in which no provision is made in contemplation of such an event, shall be a revocation of the will."
9. See, e.g., Toomer v. Van Antwerp Realty Corp., 238 Ala. 87, 189 So. 549, 123
A.L.R. 1063 (1939) ; Strong v. Strong, 106 Conn. 76, 137 Atl. 17 (1927) ; Ash v. Ash,
9 Ohio St. 383 (1859); In re Patterson's Estate, 282 Pa. 396, 128 Ati. 100 (1925)
(illegitimate child). Generally these statutes provide that after-born children shall take
as though the testator had died intestate, but another class of statutes found in a few
of the states provides that the birth of a child revokes the will. 1 PAGE, WILLS 525-26
(3d ed. 1941) ; RoOD, WILLS §§ 382-83 (2d ed. 1926). In Tennessee when the common
law rule would apply (marriage and birth of child subsequent to execution), the will
is completely revoked even though the statute as to pretermitted heirs, which would
only allow the child to take an intestate share, was in effect. Hailey v. Hailey, 27
Tenn. App. 496, 182 S.vV2d 127 (W.S. 1943). In another case the court held that a
will was not revoked by a subsequent marriage and birth of a child since the widow
and child would take the same share regardless of Whether will was revoked. Frank v.
Frank, 170 Tenn. 112, 92 S.W.2d 409 (1936).
10. The 1949 amendment to the Georgia adoption statute which is applied in the
instant case provides that, "Said adopted child shall be considered in all respects as if
it were a child of natural bodily issue of petitioner or petitioners, and shall enjoy every
right and privilege of a natural child of petitioner or petitioners; and shall be deemed
a natural child of petitioner or petitioners to inherit under the laws of descent and
distribution in the absence of a will and to take under the provisions of any instruments
of testamentary gift, bequest, devise, or legacy, unless expressly excluded therefrom."
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (Supp. 1949).
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child has the same effect as the birth of a child. This depends to some extent
on the language used respecting the revocation of wills and the adoption of
children." Adoption statutes may be divided into two general classes. One
class expressly provides for revocation of a will by the subsequent adoption
of a child,'" while the other merely provides that an adopted child shall have
the same rights as a natural born child. 13
The great majority of courts that have dealt with the problem of interpreting these statutes have held that the adoption of a child alters an
antecedent will in the same manner as the birth of a child.' 4 This result is
reached by the tendency of the courts to look to the purpose of the legislature
in enacting the adoption statutes. These statutes are generally designed to
encourage adoption and protect the welfare of the child, and the theory is
that such welfare is best promoted by giving an adopted child the same
status as a natural born child.'0
Those states which have refused to take this position have done so by

strictly interpreting the adoption statutes. They have argued that if the legislature intended to give adopted children the same benefit enjoyed by natural
born children with respect to antecedent wills, it would have done so, and
to give any other effect to these statutes would be to amend them by implication.' 6 This view, which is taken by the dissenting opinion in the instant
case, is a decided minority. Certainly the policy reasons for providing for
natural born children should be equally applicable to adopted children. In
the majority of states the legislatures have clearly expressed their intentions
by providing in effect that the adopted child shall be considered in all respects
as if it were a child of natural bodily issue of the adopting parents and that
it shall enjoy every right and privilege of a natural born child1' The court
in the instant case accepted this rationale, which is the basis for the majority
view that a will is altered by the subsequent adoption of a child.
11. ATrIxNsoN, WILLS 404 (1937); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 527 (3d ed. 1941).
12. CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 6956 (1949); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 273 (1930).
13. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 5 (1940); ARx. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 109
(1947); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.200 (Baldwin 1943); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269
(1942); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9614 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.37 (Williams
Supp. 1951); TEX. STAT. REV. Civ. art. 46a, § 9 (1948). TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8131-32
(Williams 1934) relating to pretermitted children and the statute on adoption are related and should be interpreted as part of the same act. Marshall v. Marshall, 25
Tenn. App. 309, 156 S.W.2d 449 (M.S. 1941).
14. Fulton Trust Co. v. Trowbridge, 126 Conn. 369, 11 A.2d 393 (1940); Woolford v. Woolford, 76 A.2d 5 (Del. Orphans' Ct. 1950); Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill.
396, 65 N.E. 782 (1902) ; Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Iowa 159, 80 N.W. 332, 46 L.R.A. 171,
77 Am. St. Rep. 524 (1899); In re Rendell's Estate, 244 Mich. 197, 221 N.W. 116
(1928) ; Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605, 87 N.W. 853 (1901).
15. Bilderback v. Clark, 106 Kan. 737, 189 Pac. 977 (1920).
16. Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N.E. 860 (1890) ; Succession of Carre, 212 La.
839, 33 So.2d 655 (1948) ; Note, 22 Ky. L.J. 600.
17. This is a paraphrase of the adoption statute involved in the instant case. GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-414 (Supp. 1949). See note 13, supra.

